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ARBITRATION FROM THE VIEWPOINT OF
THE PRACTICING ATTORNEY: AN ANALYSIS
OF ARBITRATION CASES DECIDED BY THE
NEW YORK STATE COURT OF APPEALS
FROM JANUARY, 1973 TO SEPTEMBER, 1985
Judge Hugh R. Jones*
I. Introduction
Over a period of years, recourse has increasingly been had to
arbitration as a method of dispute resolution in both the public and
the private sectors. There is every indication that this trend will
continue and expand in the future. In his opening address at the
1985 Annual Meeting of the American Law Institute last May, Chief
Justice Warren Burger urged us to "take a fresh look at the entire
structure we have created to resolve disputes" and deplored the fact
that "as we now practice it, that system is too costly, too painful,
too destructive and too inefficient."' At the recent meeting of the
American Arbitration Association, the Chief Justice again urged
recourse to arbitration.2
The Community Dispute Resolution Centers Program of our state's
Unified Court System is expanding each year, with new centers being
established across the state. Chapter 156 of the Laws of 1984 made
the Program a permanent component of that System,3 and it was
expanded by Chapter 91 of the Laws of 1985. 4 In June, 1984, the
New York State Bar Association released an interesting report, en-
* Resident Counsel, Hiscock & Barclay; Associate Judge, New York State
Court of Appeals, 1973-84; A.B., 1935, LL.D., 1974, Hamilton College; J.D.,
1939, Harvard Law School; LL.D., 1981, Albany Law School; Member of the
American Bar Association (House of Delegates, 1971-72); New York State Bar
Association (President, 1971-72; Member, Executive Committee 1961-72; Member,
House of Delegates 1972-to date; Chairman, Committee on Professional Ethics,
1959-63; Chairman, Tax Section, 1967) and Oneida County Bar Association (Pres-
ident, 1962), and of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York; Member,
American Law Institute, 1974-to date; Adviser, Restatement, Restitution 2d, 1981-
86
1. Remarks and Addresses at the 62nd Annual Meeting, May 14-17, 1985
A.L.1. 4, 8.
2. N.Y. Times, Aug. 22, 1985, at A21, col. 1; Arb. Times, Fall 1985, at 1,
col. 1.
3. 1984 N.Y. Laws ch. 156.
4. 1985 N.Y. Laws ch. 91.
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titled "Alternatives to Court Resolution of Disputes," applauding
and encouraging the activities of the Program.'
The American Bar Association Journal of February, 1985 contained
an article describing and promoting "The Arbitration Alternative ' 6
and, in its August, 1985 issue reported the adoption by more than
125 chief executive officers and general counsel of major corporations
of an "Alternative Dispute Resolution Corporate Policy Statement." 7
This Statement, manifesting a policy to explore out-of-court methods
to resolve disputes before pursuing litigation, was signed by American
Express, Bristol-Meyers, General Motors, I.T.T., J.C. Penney, and
Xerox, among others.' The policy is supported by significant elements
in national corporate leadership. 9
In light of these developments, and what the author perceives as
the probability of a greatly expanded use of arbitration, it appears
that an overall analysis of arbitration cases in the New York State
Court of Appeals in the last few years may be useful. The author
has been re-examining the court's decisions since January, 1973,
when he became a member of the court, a period in which there
have been well over two hundred appeals in arbitration cases. He
has elected to organize this material in a perspective that he hopes
will be of particular advantage to the practicing attorney.
1I. Arbitration Proceedings in General
Much has been written, and more spoken, on the advantages and
disadvantages of recourse to arbitration. It suffices, for the purposes
of this Article (the intention is to explicate, not to extol), to speak
in broad generalities, with the accompaniment of a caution that each
individual dispute is entitled to awindependent evaluation in light
of its own particular factors and the special context in which it
arises.
At the outset, we must understand that "[a]rbitration, despite or
because of its many merits, provides a framework for dispute res-
5. Greenawalt, Alternatives to Court Resolution of Disputes: Report of NYS-
BA's Special Committee, 56 N.Y. ST. B.J., Oct. 1984, at 36.
6. Meyerowitz, The Arbitration Alternative, 71 A.B.A. J., Feb. 1985, at 78.
7. Gold, Let's Talk, 71 A.B.A. J., Aug. 1985, at 25.
8. Id.
9. Id. ("The Policy was developed by the Center for Public Resources, which
says the National Association of Manufacturers, the Business Roundtable, the
American Insurance Association and the American Corporate Counsel Association
also support it").
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olution far different from the traditional litigation framework."' 0
The objective of judicial resolution of controversies is to determine
the rights of the litigants and to grant attendant relief, both within
the confines of carefully prescribed procedures and rules. The role
of the arbitrator is to resolve controversies between the parties as
dictated by reason and common sense, free from the rigidities of
prescribed procedure and rule. An arbitrator "may do justice as he
sees it, applying his own sense of law and equity to the facts as
he finds them to be and making an award reflecting the spirit rather
than the letter of the agreement . . . ."" "In the final analysis
'Arbitrators may do justice' and the award may well reflect the
spirit rather than the letter of the agreement."' 2 Depending on one's
perspective, the nature and quality of the proof and arguments
available, and the ultimate objective sought to be achieved, this may
make the prospect of arbitration attractive in varying degrees or,
perhaps, a horror to contemplate.
In general, in comparison with judicial litigation, arbitration pro-
ceedings are thought to be less expensive and less time-consuming,
resulting in expeditious dispositions. A very real aspect of finality
attaches to the initial award, without the prospect of endless appellate
procedures or the prospect of return to the arbitral forum for a
new determination. Awards in arbitration, as a practical matter, are
nearly immune from judicial review. The process itself, and thus its
end product, is often more readily comprehensible to the client.
There is not confronted the sometimes difficult-to-understand con-
straints of rules of pleading, presentation of evidence, and practice
at both the initial and appellate stages. The participation of the
client in the decision-making process is both more significant and
more satisfying.
With respect to the quality of the decision-making itself, there
can often be made available an expertise which is unavailable in
judicial proceedings. It is one thing to offer the testimony of com-
petent expert witnesses; it is quite another to infuse the decision-
10. Port Washington Union Free School Dist. v. Port Washington Teachers
Ass'n, 45 N.Y.2d 411, 422, 380 N.E.2d 280, 285, 408 N.Y.S.2d 453, 458 (1978)
(Breitel, C.J., concurring).
11. Silverman v. Benmor Coats, Inc., 61 N.Y.2d 299, 308, 461 N.E.2d 1261,
1266, 473 N.Y.S.2d 774, 779 (1984) (cited with approval in Haverstraw v. Rockland
County Patrolmen's Benevolent Ass'n, 65 N.Y.2d 677, 678, 481 N.E.2d 248, 248,
491 N.Y.S.2d 616, 616 (1985)).
12. Rochester City School Dist. v. Rochester Teachers Ass'n, 41 N.Y.2d 578,
582, 362 N.E.2d 977, 981, 394 N.Y.S.2d 179, 182 (1977) (citation omitted).
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reaching with such expertise. This may occur when the issues at
stake include the adequacy of performance of agreements for con-
struction, for manufacture, or for purchase and sale of merchandise
and where commercial practice, trade usage, and the reasonable
expectations of the parties have a legitimate bearing. Problems of
valuation of real and personal property, problems in admiralty, and
patent licensing often lend themselves to resolution in arbitration.
In labor relations, considerations of the ongoing relationships of the
parties may make arbitration especially suitable. Therefore, the par-
ties may desire and find arbitration the more acceptable, equitable,
and fair method to resolve their differences, free from judicial
rigidities, both in the determination of the merits of their dispute
and in the fashioning of remedies.
Arbitration offers the very great advantage of confidentiality and
the preservation of privacy, as to both the fact of controversy and
the details of its resolution. Other advantages in the context of
particular relationships and particular disputes will come to mind.
For one schooled and experienced in the judicial process, however,
the prospect of arbitration inescapably presents the spectre of being
cut adrift, as it were, and triggers understandable anxieties. There
is nothing, except-perhaps-experience, to equal the confidence we
have in the fairness and protection to be found in the judicial system,
both at nisi prius and, more particularly, in the present context, in
the procedures for appellate review and rectification of error. Those
of us trained and experienced in the law and the legal system
legitimately take great comfort on behalf of our clients (as well as
ourselves!) in the identification and containment of issues, the as-
surances of predictability of the presentation of evidence, the guar-
antee of procedural due process, the availability of appellate review
for correction of error, and the possibility of a second chance at
an initial determination (with the accompanying extended oppor-
tunities for negotiated settlements), and in general, protection against
the risks of an unstructured, free-wheeling, non-reviewable deter-
mination.
There can be no general rubric and no set of rubrics which may
be laid over a controversy, in the manner of a template, to dictate
the choice or rejection of arbitration. Each controversy or set of
controversies merits its own evaluation with respect to the desirability
and feasibility of recourse to arbitration."
13. Maye v. Bluestein, 40 N.Y.2d 113, 118, 351 N.E.2d 717, 720, 386 N.Y.S.2d
69, 72 (1976); Professional Staff Congress/City Univ. of N.Y. v. Board of Higher
Educ., 39 N.Y.2d 319, 325, 347 N.E.2d 918, 922, 383 N.Y.S.2d 592, 596 (1976).
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In the material which follows, certain distinctions should be borne
in mind, although specific reference to them has been incorporated
in the text at some points. There is a difference between submission
of an existing controversy to arbitration for resolution and an agree-
ment to submit future disputes to resolution by arbitration., 4 Dif-
ferences of position which arise in labor relations between employee
and employer fall into two categories: grievance arbitration 5 and
interest arbitration. 6 Finally, there are procedural differentiations to
draw between voluntary and compulsory arbitration, with a slightly
expanded scope of judicial review of awards made in compulsory
arbitration.
I11. The Arbitration Agreement
The practicing attorney has heavy threshold responsibilities in
advising whether the particular matter, whether by way of submis-
sions or agreements to arbitrate in the future, should go to arbitration
or be left to judicial resolution.
A. Is a Choice Available?
The first question the attorney must ask is whether arbitration is
mandated by statute. For example, arbitration of claims is com-
pulsory under the Automobile Accident Indemnity Act (so-called
"No Fault")," but its use is restricted in some consumer transac-
tions. 8 In each case, the statutory prescription is controlling.
14. However, New York's Civil Practice Law and Rules appear to draw no
procedural distinctions between these discrete proceedings. N.Y. CIv. PRAC. LAW
§ 7501 (McKinney 1980).
15. Grievance arbitration involves the resolution of specific grievances which
have arisen. See D. SIEGEL, NEW YORK PRACTICE § 586, at 829 n.23 (1978)
(interest arbitration "is in contrast with the more usual situation, in which a dispute
under an existing agreement is arbitrated-'grievance' arbitration in labor termi-
nology") [hereinafter cited as SIEGEL].
16. Interest arbitration involves the resolution of terms and provisions of pro-
spective collective bargaining agreements and employment contracts. See SIEGEL,
supra note 15, § 586, at 829 n.23 ("When after an impasse these matters go to
arbitration, labor parlance calls it 'interest' arbitration, in which the arbitrators
actually write a contract for the parties").
17. N.Y. INs. LAW § 5105(b) (McKinney 1985) ("The sole remedy of any insurer
or compensation provider to recover on a claim arising pursuant to subsection (a)
hereof, shall be the submission of the controversy to mandatory arbitration pursuant
to procedures promulgated or approved by the superintendent. Such procedures
shall also be utilized to resolve all disputes arising between insurers concerning
their responsibility for the payment of first party benefits.").
18. See, e.g., N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 198-a (McKinney Supp. 1986); 15 U.S.C.
§ 2310 (1982).
19861
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Second, the attorney must consider whether arbitration of the
particular subject matter or the remedy sought is barred by con-
siderations of public policy. Here, predictability is less certain. A
public policy to bar access to arbitration must be "strong," "sub-
stantial," or involve matters of "gross illegality or its equivalent,"
or of a non-delegable "statutory or constitutional authority."' 9 The
courts will intervene only where the policy is such as to "prohibit,
in an absolute sense, particular matters from being decided or certain
relief being granted by an arbitrator." 20 Frequent resorts to and
incantations of public policy as calling for vacatur of arbitration
awards have been regularly rejected by the Court of Appeals; public
policy is not a promising predicate on which to base arguments in
opposition to arbitration.
Because, in general, considerations of public policy normally arise
after the submission or agreement to arbitrate has been concluded,
either pre-award or post-award, the relevant cases are discussed at
a subsequent point."
B. Is Arbitration Appropriate?
If a choice is available, initial advice must be offered as to whether
the particular controversy or series of prospective controversies should
be resolved in arbitration or left to judicial determination. The
advantages and disadvantages of arbitration should be canvassed.
Consideration should be given to the nature of the controversy and
to the remedy sought, to the positions and attitudes of the parties,
to prognostications of success in the outcome, to the risks of failure,
and to any special or peculiar factors.
C. Considerations in Drafting the Arbitration Clause
If, after weighing the prospective advantages and disadvantages
of arbitration and judicial proceedings, it is decided to have recourse
to arbitration, inasmuch as such arbitration will wholly be the crea-
19. Port Washington Union Free School Dist. v. Port Washington Teachers
Ass'n, 45 N.Y.2d 411, 421-23, 380 N.E.2d 280, 285-86, 408 N.Y.S.2d 453, 458-
59 (1978) (Breitel, C.J., concurring) (cited with approval in Board of Educ. v.
Glaubman, 53 N.Y.2d 781, 782, 422 N.E.2d 567, 568, 439 N.Y.S.2d 907, 908
(1981)).
20. Sprinzen v. Nomberg, 46 N.Y.2d 623, 631, 389 N.E.2d 456, 460, 415
N.Y.S.2d 974, 978 (1979) (cited with approval in Haverstraw v. Rockland County
Patrolmen's Benevolent Ass'n, 65 N.Y.2d 677, 678, 481 N.E.2d 248, 249, 491
N.Y.S.2d 616, 617 (1985)).
21. See infra notes 56-69 and accompanying text.
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ture of voluntary agreement, great care must then be taken in drafting
the arbitration clause. By specification in their submission or agree-
ment, the parties can almost completely control the arbitral process.
Experience shows that much too little attention has been focused
at this critical stage of the process.
Fundamental consideration must be addressed, of course, to the
scope of the arbitration clause-whether it is to be a so-called
"broad" arbitration clause or whether its scope is to be somehow
limited or restricted. Thus, what precisely are the issues which the
parties intend to be submitted to the arbitrator? The arbitration
clause should be analyzed both as a choice of forum and as a
delineation of issues. It is at the conclusion of this analysis and on
the formulation of the desired scope of arbitration that the draftsmen
of arbitration clauses all too often rest. Again, experience shows
that thoughtful anticipation and careful expression can avoid ques-
tions which may otherwise be left to future resolution.
Issues to be considered in drafting the arbitration clause include:
(1) whether compliance with contractual specifications as to time
and manner of instituting arbitration proceedings and as to pro-
cedures prior to arbitration is to be determined by the arbitrator in
the course of and as incident to the management of the arbitration
proceeding or by the courts as an explicitly stated condition precedent
to access to the arbitration forum;22 (2) whether there must be
mutuality of the right to arbitration, that is, may one party have
the right to arbitrate irrespective of whether the other or another
has a corresponding right; 23 (3) if the rights of third parties may
be implicated, whether the arbitrator may resolve the issues between
the parties to the arbitration agreement and grant a remedy irre-
spective of the non-participation of such third parties; 24 (4) in a
collective bargaining agreement, whether the right to grieve or to
seek arbitration, or both, should be accorded the individual employee
as well as the union;21 (5) whether duplicative review of disciplinary
action should be permitted by both arbitration and departmental
22. County of Rockland v. Primiano Constr. Co., 51 N.Y.2d 1, 9, 409 N.E.2d
951, 954-55, 431 N.Y.S.2d 478, 482 (1980); United Nations Dev. Corp. v. Norkin
Plumbing Co., 45 N.Y.2d 358, 364, 380 N.E.2d 253, 255-56, 408 N.Y.S.2d 424,
427-28 (1978).
23. Waldron v. Goddess, 61 N.Y.2d 181, 461 N.E.2d 273, 274, 473 N.Y.S.2d
136, 137 (1984).
24. See Silverman v. Benmor Coats, Inc., 61 N.Y.2d 299, 310, 461 N.E.2d
1261, 1267, 473 N.Y.S.2d 774, 780 (1984).
25. See Diaz v. Pilgrim State Psychiatric Center, 62 N.Y.2d 693, 465 N.E.2d
32, 476 N.Y.S.2d 525 (1984).
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review procedures and, if so, whether provision should be made for
reconciliation of possibly inconsistent results;16 (6) in a document
modifying or terminating the substantive provisions of their agree-
ment, whether the parties also should expressly revise their arbitration
clause (if not, the interpretation and application of their document
of modification of termination will be for the arbitrator and not
the courts to determine);2 7 (7) whether there are to be any limitations
on the power of the arbitrator, either in resolving the substantive
issues or in fashioning the remedies;28 and (8) whether, and to what
extent, the arbitration award is to have preclusive effect in subsequent
arbitration or judicial proceedings between the parties.29
Other instances in which explicit provisions relating to the access
to the arbitral forum, the conduct of the arbitration proceeding,
the available remedies, or the consequences to attend the arbitration
award may be thought desirable will occur to the careful, forward-
looking draftsman. The author's impression is that altogether too
little attention has customarily been devoted to the drafting of the
arbitration clause-literally a determinative stage in the arbitration
process.
IV. Judicial Proceedings With Reference to Arbitration Pre-
Award
A. In General
Initially, there was a judicial hostility to arbitration as ousting
the courts of their legitimate and traditional adjudicative role.3 0 This
has now been reversed almost entirely in the courts of New York.
Our courts now look with favor on arbitration and, as a matter of
26. See Port Auth. v. Port Auth. Police Benevolent Ass'n, 49 N.Y.2d 781, 403
N.E.2d 448, 426 N.Y.S.2d 725 (1980).
27. Schlaifer v. Sedlow, 51 N.Y.2d 181, 185, 412 N.E.2d 1294, 1296, 433
N.Y.S.2d 67, 69-70 (1980) (per curiam).
28. Board of Educ. v. Barni, 49 N.Y.2d 311, 315, 401 N.E.2d 912, 913-14,
425 N.Y.S.2d 554, 556 (1980); North Syracuse Cent. School Dist. v. North Syracuse
Educ. Ass'n, 45 N.Y.2d 195, 200, 379 N.E.2d 1193, 1196, 408 N.Y.S.2d 64, 67
(1978). If limitations on the arbitrator's power to resolve substantive issues or to
fashion remedies are intended, such limitations must be contained in the arbitration
clause itself-not in the substantive provisions of the agreement-if their enforcement
by judicial action is desired. Silverman v. Benmor Coats, Inc., 61 N.Y.2d 299,
302, 461 N.E.2d 1261, 1263, 473 N.Y.S.2d 774, 776 (1984).
29. American Ins. Co. v. Messinger, 43 N.Y.2d 184, 189, 371 N.E.2d 798, 801,
401 N.Y.S.2d 36, 39 (1977).
30. Meacham v. Jamestown, F. & C. R.R. Co., 211 N.Y. 346, 351, 105 N.E.
653 (1914).
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policy, interfere as little as possible with the freedom of consenting
parties to resolve their disputes by that means."
B. Proceedings to Compel or to Resist Arbitration
The judicial procedures available both to compel and to resist
arbitration are prescribed in Article 75 of the Civil Practice Law
and Rules (CPLR).3 2 The practicing attorney should be thoroughly
familiar with the provisions of this Article. Little advantage would
be realized, for present purposes, in any detailed explication of these
provisions. A few scattered comments based on recent decisions of
the Court of Appeals, however, may be appropriate.
The statute limits the scope of judicial inquiry and possible in-
tervention to the classic three threshold questions: (1) was there a
valid agreement to arbitrate; (2) if so, was that agreement complied
with; and (3) is the substantive claim statutorily time-barred?3 If
these questions are not raised by a timely application on behalf of
the party opposing arbitration, they are waived.3 4 The application
for a judicial stay on any of these grounds must be made within
twenty days after service of the demand35 if an appropriate statement
to that effect is included in the demand for arbitration. 6 The courts
are powerless to extend this statutorily prescribed time period
3 7
31. Sprinzen v. Nomberg, 46 N.Y.2d 623, 629, 389 N.E.2d 456, 458-59, 415
N.Y.S.2d 974, 976-77 (1979); Siegel v. Lewis, 40 N.Y.2d 687, 689, 358 N.E.2d
484, 485, 389 N.Y.S.2d 800, 801 (1976); cf. N.Y. Civ. PsAc. LAW §§ 7501-14
(McKinney 1980) (statute limits scope of judicial inquiry and recognizes enforceability
of arbitration agreements).
32. N.Y. CIv. PRAC. LAW §§ 7501-14 (McKinney 1980).
33. N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAW § 7503 (McKinney 1980); see County of Rockland v.
Primiano Constr. Co., 51 N.Y.2d 1, 6-8, 409 N.E.2d 951, 953-54, 431 N.Y.S.2d
478, 480-81 (1980).
34. N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAW § 7503 (McKinney 1980); Tilbury Fabrics, Inc. v.
Stillwater, Inc., 56 N.Y.2d 624, 625, 435 N.E.2d 1093, 450 N.Y.S.2d 478 (1982);
American Ins. Co. v. Messinger, 43 N.Y.2d 184, 191, 371 N.E.2d 798, 803, 401
N.Y.S.2d 36, 40 (1977); Rochester City School Dist. v. Rochester Teachers Ass'n,
41 N.Y.2d 578, 583, 362 N.E.2d 977, 981, 394 N.Y.S.2d 179, 182 (1977). But see
James Talcott, Inc. v. M. Lowenstein & Sons, Inc., 33 N.Y.2d 924, 309 N.E.2d
124, 353 N.Y.S.2d 721 (1973).
35. N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAW § 7503(c) (McKinney 1980). In Fashion Envelopes,
Inc. v. Minsky, 51 N.Y.2d 799, 412 N.E.2d 1325, 433 N.Y.S.2d 100 (1980), the
court held that proper service of the demand on the president and sole shareholder
was sufficient to give notice to the corporation. 51 N.Y.2d at 801. Service by
ordinary mail, however, is insufficient. Yak Taxi, Inc. v. Teke, 41 N.Y.2d 1020,
1021-22, 363 N.E.2d 1372, 1373, 395 N.Y.S.2d 627, 628 (1977).
36. N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAW § 7503(b) (McKinney 1980).
37. Spychalski v. Continental Ins. Cos., 45 N.Y.2d 847, 849, 382 N.E.2d 765,
766, 410 N.Y.S.2d 65, 66 (1978); Aaacon Auto Transp., Inc. v. State Farm Mut.
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Two qualifications on this general proposition should be noted,
however. First, the court has held that a misleading demand for
arbitration is insufficient to trigger the running of the statutory
period.38 Second, the court has held that the statutory prescription
is inapplicable where there is no agreement whatsoever between the
parties with reference to arbitration, as distinguished from the sit-
uation in which the parties did make an agreement to arbitrate, but
the objecting party contends that it is not valid, that it does not
include the claim sought to be arbitrated, or that it has not been
complied with.39 Incidentally, the court has held that failure to include
the twenty-day statement in the demand for arbitration results only
in relieving the objector from the requirement that the stay appli-
cation be made within a twenty-day period. 40
1. Was There an Agreement to Arbitrate?
The cases disposing of applications for stays of arbitration on the
ground "that a valid agreement was not made' '4  fall into two
categories. In the first are those cases in which it is asserted that
there was no agreement whatsoever to arbitrate; the second consists
of those cases in which it is contended that there was no enforceable
agreement to arbitrate the particular claim asserted, either because
the issue is one otherwise properly to be decided by the courts, or
because the claim did not come within the embrace of the arbitration
agreement between the parties. 42
Auto. Ins. Co., 41 N.Y.2d 951, 952, 363 N.E.2d 359, 394 N.Y.S.2d 635, cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 859 (1977); Aetna Life & Casualty Co. v. Stekardis, 34 N.Y.2d
182, 183-84, 313 N.E.2d 53, 356 N.Y.S.2d 587, 589 (1974); Raisler Corp. v. New York
City Hous. Auth., 32 N.Y.2d 274, 280, 298 N.E.2d 91, 93, 344 N.Y.S.2d 917,
920-21 (1973).
38. Crawford v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. 35 N.Y.2d 291,
296, 319 N.E.2d 408, 410, 361 N.Y.S.2d 140, 143-44 (1974).
39. Matarasso v. Continental Casualty Co., 56 N.Y.2d 264, 436 N.E.2d 1305,
451 N.Y.S.2d 703 (1982).
40. Initial Trends, Inc. v. Campus Outfitters, Inc., 58 N.Y.2d 896, 447 N.E.2d
448, 460 N.Y.S.2d 500 (1983).
41. N.Y. Crv. PR.c. LAW § 7503(c) (McKinney 1980).
42. In one case, the New York State Court of Appeals articulated a difference
in its approach to resolution of the question whether there was an agreement to
arbitrate, depending on the subject matter area in which the question arises:
[A] difference in perspective and approach has evolved between arbitration
in commercial matters and arbitration in labor relations. In the former
it is the rule that the parties will not be held to have chosen arbitration
as the forum for the resolution of their disputes in the absence of an
express, unequivocal agreement to that effect; absent such an explicit
commitment neither party may be compelled to arbitrate . . . . In the
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a. Was There Any Agreement?
The statute requires that both an agreement to arbitrate and the
submission of a particular dispute to arbitration be in writing. 43 It
is not always necessary that the writing be signed, however, so long
as there is other proof that the parties actually agreed on it." This
requirement of a writing is met, of course, by manifestation of the
agreement in a single document.45 It may also be satisfied by an
amalgam of several paper writings. 46 A "battle of forms" in which
there has been an exchange of commercial forms, some of which
have arbitration clauses and others which do not, may not be
sufficient to establish an agreement to arbitrate. 47
field of labor relations, by contrast, the general rule is the converse.
Because of the recognition that arbitration has been demonstrated to be
a salutary method of resolving labor disputes, because of the public
policy (principally expressed in the Federal cases) which favors arbitration
as a means of resolving such disputes, and because of the associated
available inference that the parties to a collective bargaining agreement
probably intended to resolve their differences by arbitration, the courts
have held that controversies arising between the parties to such an
agreement fall within the scope of the arbitration clause unless the parties
have employed language which clearly manifests an intent to exclude a
particular subject matter.
Acting Superintendent of Schools v. United Liverpool Faculty Ass'n, 42 N.Y.2d
509, 512, 369 N.E.2d 746, 748, 399 N.Y.S.2d 189, 191 (1977) (citations omitted).
43. N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAW § 7501 (McKinney 1980). Section 7501 provides:
A written agreement to submit any controversy thereafter arising or any
existing controversy to arbitration is enforceable without regard to thejusticiable character of the controversy and confers jurisdiction on the
courts of the state to enforce it and to enter judgment on an award.
In determining any matter arising under this article, the court shall not
consider whether the claim with respect to which arbitration is sought
is tenable, or otherwise pass upon the merits of the dispute.
Id.
44. Crawford v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 35 N.Y.2d 291,
299, 319 N.E.2d 408, 412, 361 N.Y.S.2d 140, 146 (1974).
45. I.J.S. Fabrics, Inc. v. Dan River, Inc., 56 N.Y.2d 755, 437 N.E.2d 260,
452 N.Y.S.2d 1 (1982) (signature of document containing arbitration clause after
deletion by signer of warranty provision therein); American Utex Int'l, Ltd. v. ICC
Corp., 52 N.Y.2d 888, 418 N.E.2d 1323, 437 N.Y.S.2d 304 (1981) (signature by
both parties of sales note).
46. Just In-Materials Designs Ltd. v. I.T.A.D. Assocs., Inc., 61 N.Y.2d 882,
462 N.E.2d 1188, 474 N.Y.S.2d 470 (1984) (retention by both parties of documents
containing arbitration clauses prepared, by a common broker); Bayly, Martin &
Fay, Inc. v. Glaser, 60 N.Y.2d 577, 454 N.E.2d 124, 467 N.Y.S.2d 43 (1983)(agreement to arbitrate claims arising under stock purchase agreement found in
three interlocking agreements: employment agreement containing arbitration clause;
guarantee agreement; and stock purchase agreement).
47. Marlene Indus. Corp. v. Carnac Textiles, Inc., 45 N.Y.2d 327, 333, 380
N.E.2d 239, 240, 408 N.Y.S.2d 410, 411 (1978).
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After what was perceived, following the court's decision in Marlene
Industrial Corporation v. Carnac Textiles,4 as ambivalence, the court
has concluded that the existence of an agreement to arbitrate may
be established by proof of a prior course of dealing 49 or by proof
of custom and practice in the industry. 0 Although the doctrinal
predicate for these decisions may be said to be that familiar to the
law of contracts in general, there is a more demanding standard of
proof in arbitration cases because of the general requirement that
an agreement to arbitrate must be express and unequivocal." Where
the moving papers fail to demonstrate that there is a substantial
question as to the existence of a valid agreement to arbitrate, an
application for a stay will be denied. 2
Three cases have presented variations on the proposition that,
although there may have been an agreement to arbitrate as between
certain persons, a third person not a party to that agreement did
not derive the benefit of that agreement or was not bound thereby. 3
In Lane v. Abel-Bey, 4 the third case, the court concluded that
whether the corporation was bound by an agreement to arbitrate
executed by all the shareholders was a threshold question which,
not having been raised on a timely application for a stay by the
corporation, could not later be raised by the corporation or anyone
on its behalf.5
48. 45 N.Y.2d 327, 380 N.E.2d 239, 408 N.Y.S.2d 410 (1978).
49. Woodcrest Fabrics, Inc. v. B & R Textile Corp., 61 N.Y.2d 887, 462 N.E.2d
1199, 474 N.Y.S.2d 481 (1984); Michel & Co. v. Anabasis Trade, Inc., 50 N.Y.2d
951, 409 N.E.2d 933, 431 N.Y.S.2d 459 (1980); see Schubtex, Inc. v. Allen Snyder,
Inc., 49 N.Y.2d 1, 399 N.E.2d 1154, 424 N.Y.S.2d 133 (1979).
50. See Schubtex, Inc. v. Allen Snyder, Inc., 49 N.Y.2d 1, 6, 399 N.E.2d 1154,
1156, 424 N.Y.S.2d 133, 135 (1979).
51. In S. Kornblum Metals Co. v. lntsel Corp., 38 N.Y.2d 376, 342 N.E.2d
591, 379 N.Y.S.2d 826 (1976), the court held that the record sustained the verdict
of the jury, to which the issue had been submitted, that there was an agreement
to arbitrate.
52. Schachter v. Lester Witte & Co., 41 N.Y.2d 1067, 364 N.E.2d 840, 396
N.Y.S.2d 175 (1977).
53. Castagna & Son v. Michel Plumbing, Inc., 61 N.Y.2d 841, 462 N.E.2d 139,
473 N.Y.S.2d 962 (1984) (arbitration clause in contract between owner and general
contractor did not support demand for arbitration by subcontractor where sub-
contract contained no arbitration clause); M.I.F. Sec. Co. v. Stamm & Co., 60
N.Y.2d 936, 459 N.E.2d 193, 471 N.Y.S.2d 84 (1983) (arbitration clause in the
constitution of American Stock Exchange was not sufficient to bind a limited
partnership member to arbitrate claims of an entity which was only a division of
limited partnership).
54. 50 N.Y.2d 864, 407 N.E.2d 1337, 430 N.Y.S.2d 41 (1980).
55. Id.
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Another series of cases raised issues as to the duration of what
concededly was at one time an agreement to arbitrate. In Waldron
v. Goddess,16 the court held that an arbitration clause in an em-
ployment contract did not survive the expiration of that contract
where, although the employment continued, the objecting employee
refused to execute a new employment contract." In Steigerwald v.
Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc.,5" the court found that an arbitration
clause in an application for employment with Reynolds did not
commit the employee to arbitrate claims with the corporation into
which Reynolds subsequently merged.5 9 Further, in Muh v. Risher,
60
an agreement to arbitrate was held to survive expiration of the
substantive agreement. 61 Finally, in New York Times Co. v. New
York Typographical Union No. 6,62 the court found that an agreement
to arbitrate continued pending negotiations for a new labor contract.
63
In Travelers Indemnity Co. v. Kammer" and Liberty Mutual
Insurance Co. v. Stollerman,65 two cases arising under the Insurance
Law, the court decided that, inasmuch as there was a failure on
the part of one insurer effectively to cancel a policy of insurance,
there was no obligation on the part of another insurer to arbitrate
with the claimant. 66
Reference should be made at this point to some related holdings
of the New York State Court of Appeals. In Waldron v. Goddess,
67
it was held that, where a contractual provision limited the agreement
to arbitrate to situations in which there was a mutuality of obligation,
arbitration would not be compelled absent such mutuality. 61 In this
connection, it may be noted, however, that the availability of al-
.56. 61 N.Y.2d 181, 461 N.E.2d 273, 473 N.Y.S.2d 136 (1984).
57. Id. at 185, 461 N.E.2d at 275, 473 N.Y.S.2d at 138.
.58. 56 N.Y.2d 621, 435 N.E.2d 1097, 450 N.Y.S.2d 482 (1982).
59. Id.
60. 38 N.Y.2d 441, 343 N.E.2d 742, 381 N.Y.S.2d 23 (1975).
.61. Id. at 444, 343 N.E.2d at 743, 381 N.Y.S.2d at 25.
62. 34 N.Y.2d 555, 310 N.E.2d 537, 354 N.Y.S.2d 940, cert. dismissed, 418
U.S. 901 (1974).
63. Id. at 556-57.
64. 51 N.Y.2d 792, 412 N.E.2d 1323, 433 N.Y.S.2d 98 (1980).65. *.50 N.Y.2d 895'.408 N.E.2d 920, 430 N.Y.S.2d 591 (1980).
,66. Travelers Indemnity Co. v. Kammer, 51 N.Y.2d 792, 412 N.E.2d 1323, 433
N.Y.S.2d 98 (1980) (failure to comply with statutory prescription as to form of
notice of cancellation); Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Stollerman, 50 N.Y.2d 895, 408
N.E.2d 920, 430 N.Y.S.2d 591 (1980) (same).
67. 61 N.Y.2d 181, 461 N.E.2d 273, 473 N.Y.S.2d 136 (1984).
68. Id. at 184-86, 461, N.E.2d at 275-76, 473 N.Y.S.2d at 138-39.
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ternative remedies will not defeat the right to arbitration 69 and on
principle, it would seem that the parties should be able to enter
into an express agreement which conferred on one but not another
the right to resolve all or specified disputes by arbitration.70
In Antinore v. State of New York,7' the court held that an employee
not a party to the agreement to arbitrate could not object to ar-
bitration between the parties to the agreement.72 In Franklin Central
School v. Franklin Teachers Association,73 the court held that a
school nurse came within the scope of the collective bargaining
agreement and was, therefore, entitled to the benefit of the arbitration
clause in that agreement. 74
b. Is the Claim Within the Scope of the Agreement to
Arbitrate?
(1) Is Arbitration of the Claim Barred by Considerations of
Public Policy?5
The general rule is that to bar judicial enforcement of a voluntary
arbitration clause on the ground of public policy, the pertinent public
policy must be strong, involving "gross illegality or its equivalent"
or a non-delegable constitutional or statutorily prescribed duty. 76 The
courts will intervene only where public policy is such as to "prohibit,
in an absolute sense, particular matters being decided or certain
relief being granted by an arbitrator. ' 77 The public policy contention
69. Riccardi v. Modern Silver Linen Supply Co., 36 N.Y.2d 945, 335 N.E.2d
856, 373 N.Y.S.2d 551 (1975).
70. Compare Rosenblum v. Steiner, 43 N.Y.2d 896, 374 N.E.2d 610, 403
N.Y.S.2d 716 (1978) (borrower may submit issue of usury to arbitration) with Durst
v. Abrash, 17 N.Y.2d 445, 213 N.E.2d 887, 266 N.Y.S.2d 806 (1965) (public policy
prohibits lender from submitting issue of usury to arbitration).
71. 40 N.Y.2d 921, 358 N.E.2d 268, 389 N.Y.S.2d 576 (1976).
72. 40 N.Y.2d at 921-22.
73. 51 N.Y.2d 348, 414 N.E.2d 685, 434 N.Y.S.2d 185 (1980).
74. Id. at 355-56, 414 N.E.2d at 688, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 188-89.
75. Objections on the ground that arbitration is precluded by considerations of
public policy may be an exception to the general rule that questions of arbitrability
must be raised on a timely application for a stay, and if not so raised, are waived.
Prudence, however, would dictate no delay.
76. Port Washington Union Free School Dist. v. Port Washington Teachers
Ass'n, 45 N.Y.2d 411, 419-25, 380 N.E.2d 280, 285-86, 408 N.Y.S.2d 453. 458-
59 (1978) (Breitel, C.J., concurring) (cited with approval in Board of Educ. v.
Glaubman, 53 N.Y.2d 781, 782, 422 N.E.2d 567, 568, 439 N.Y.S.2d 907, 908
(1981)).
77. Sprinzen v. Nomberg, 46 N.Y.2d 623, 631, 389 N.E.2d 456, 460, 415
N.Y.S.2d 974, 978 (1979) (cited with approval in Town of Haverstraw v. Rockland
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is evaluated and determined as of the date of the judicial decision."8
Although frequent attempts have been made to resist arbitration
on the ground of proscriptive public policy, only seldom have they
been successful. The New York State Court of Appeals has held
that considerations of public policy foreclosed recourse to arbitration
in several cases.79 In many more cases, however, the court has rejected
assertions of preclusive public policy.80
County Patrolmen's Benevolent Ass'n, 65 N.Y.2d 677, 678, 481 N.E.2d 248, 249,
491 N.Y.S.2d 616, 617 (1985)).
78. Board of Trustees v. Maplewood Teachers' Ass'n, 57 N.Y.2d 1025, 443
N.E.2d 949, 457 N.Y.S.2d 475 (1982).
79. Onteora Cent. School Dist. v. Onteora Non-Teaching Employees Ass'n, 56
N.Y.2d 769, 437 N.E.2d 281, 452 N.Y.S.2d 22 (1982) (award vacated where perceived
as encroaching upon authority of Commissioner of Education to resolve disputes
as to "ordinary contingent expenses" under Education Law § 2024); Honeoye Falls-
Lima Cent. School Dist. v. Honeoye Falls-Lima Educ. Ass'n, 49 N.Y.2d 732, 402
N.E.2d 1165, 426 N.Y.S.2d 263 (1980) (maintenance of educational standards fixed
by statute, here order of lay-offs, cannot be submitted to arbitration); Wertheim
& Co. v. Halpert, 48 N.Y.2d 681, 397 N.E.2d 386, 421 N.Y.S.2d 876 (1979) (sex
discrimination claims subject to statutory remedies cannot be resolved in arbitration
at insistence of the employer inasmuch as it is against public policy to interfere
with right of employee to pursue statutory remedies); Candor Cent. School Dist.
v. Candor Teachers Ass'n, 42 N.Y.2d 266, 366 N.E.2d 826, 397 N.Y.S.2d 737
(1977) (tenure determinations may not be reviewed in arbitration, but claimed
violation of procedural prerequisite to denial of tenure may be submitted to ar-
bitration). But note that an award sustaining a denial of tenure has been upheld
in Simon v. Boyer, 41 N.Y.2d 822, 361 N.E.2d 1037, 393 N.Y.S.2d 388 (1977).
Considerations of public policy preclude the substitution of a determination by an
arbitrator for the decision of the educational authorities, either to grant or deny
tenure, but not an award sustaining the decision of the educational authorities);
Board of Educ. v. Areman, 41 N.Y.2d 527, 362 N.E.2d 943, 394 N.Y.S.2d 143
(1977) (board cannot surrender right to inspect employee personnel files); Garrity
v. Lyle Stuart, Inc., 40 N.Y.2d 354, 353 N.E.2d 793, 386 N.Y.S.2d 831 (1976)
(punitive damages may not be awarded in arbitration); Cohoes City School Dist.
v. Cohoes Teachers Ass'n, 40 N.Y.2d 774, 358 N.E.2d 878, 390 N.Y.S.2d 53 (1976)
(to the same effect as Candor, allowing arbitration of claimed violation of structured
evaluation procedures); Aimcee Wholesale Corp. v. Tomar Prods., Inc., 21 N.Y.2d
621, 237 N.E.2d 223, 289 N.Y.S.2d 968, (1968) (enforcement of New York State's
antitrust law represents "public policy of the first magnitude").
80. In the following cases, the assertion of preclusive public policy has been
rejected in disputes arising in the field of education: Board of Educ. v. Connetquot
Teachers Ass'n, 60 N.Y.2d 840, 458 N.E.2d 373, 470 N.Y.S.2d 132 (1983) (right
of teachers' association to use office space in school buildings); Board of Trustees
v. Maplewood Teachers' Ass'n, 57 N.Y.2d 1025, 443 N.E.2d 949, 457 N.Y.S.2d
475 (1982) (enforcement after expiration of collective bargaining agreement of
provision mandating automatic salary increments); Board of Educ. v. Cattaraugus
Teacher's Ass'n, 55 N.Y.2d 951, 434 N.E.2d 262, 449 N.Y.S.2d 193 (1982) (si-
multaneous pursuits of available remedies under the Education Law and in arbi-
tration, even where potential exists for contrary determinations); Board of Educ.
v. Glaubman, 53 N.Y.2d 781, 422 N.E.2d 567, 439 N.Y.S.2d 907 (1981) (N.Y.
Educ. Law §§ 2585, 2588, addressing basic rules regarding rehiring practices, do
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(2) Is the Subject Matter of the Claim Within the Scope of the
Agreement to Arbitrate?
Because of the recurring and often little-considered use of a broad
arbitration clause, the cases in which the court has concluded that
not bar arbitration of grievance as to recall procedures of laid-off teachers); United
Liverpool Faculty Ass'n v. Board of Educ., 52 N.Y.2d 1038, 420 N.E.2d 386, 438
N.Y.S.2d 505 (1981) (arbitrator may restrict powers of district superintendent to
make tenure recommendations); Board of Educ. v. Three Village Teachers' Ass'n,
52 N.Y.2d 750, 417 N.E.2d 570, 436 N.Y.S.2d 276 (1980) (claim of violation of
procedural prerequisites to adoption of reading management system); Board of
Educ. v. New York State United Teachers, 51 N.Y.2d 994, 417 N.E.2d 89, 435
N.Y.S.2d 977 (1980) (asserted violation of agreement not to discharge during
probationary period without just cause); Board of Higher Educ. v. Brown, 49
N.Y.2d 935, 406 N.E.2d 438, 428 N.Y.S.2d 621 (1980) (sufficiency of statement
of college president's reasons for refusing reappointment); Wyandanch Union Free
School Dist. v. Wyandanch Teachers Ass'n, 48 N.Y.2d 669, 397 N.E.2d 384, 421
N.Y.S.2d 873 (1979) (asserted failure to submit proposed change in educational
policy to advisory council for its recommendation); Mineola Union Free School
Dist. v. Mineola Teachers Ass'n, 46 N.Y.2d 568, 389 N.E.2d 111, 415 N.Y.S.2d
797 (1979) (dispute with respect to payroll deductions pursuant to authorization,
withdrawal of which apparently restricted in violation of statute); Board of Educ.
v. United Fed'n of Teachers, 46 N.Y.2d 1018, 389 N.E.2d 1057, 416 N.Y.S.2d
535 (1979) (claimed violation of augmented procedural mechanisms preliminary to
dismissal); Port Washington Union Free School Dist. v. Port Washington Teachers
Ass'n, 45 N.Y.2d 411, 380 N.E.2d 280, 408 N.Y.S.2d 453 (1978) (compliance with
procedural prescriptions preliminary to implementation of an educational program
and reduction of extra-curricular activities and assignments); Port Jefferson Station
Teachers Ass'n v. Brookhaven-Comsewogue Union Free School Dist., 45 N.Y.2d
898, 383 N.E.2d 553, 411 N.Y.S.2d 1 (1978) (assignment of specialist teachers
outside area of specialty); Board of Educ. v. New Paltz United Teachers, 44 N.Y.2d
890, 379 N.E.2d 160, 407 N.Y.S.2d 632 (1978) (discontinuance of school district's
prior practice of granting free tuition to children of teachers in school system who
lived outside district); Board of Educ. v. Yonkers Fed'n of Teachers, 40 N.Y.2d
268, 353 N.E.2d 569, 386 N.Y.S.2d 657 (1976) (job security issues); Susquehanna
Valley Cent. School Dist. v. Susquehanna Valley Teachers' Ass'n, 37 N.Y.2d 614,
339 N.E.2d 132, 376 N.Y.S.2d 427 (1975) (reduction of school staff). In this group
should be identified the cases allowing arbitration of claims of non-compliance with
procedures antecedent to tenure determinations. Candor Cent. School Dist. v. Candor
Teachers Ass'n, 42 N.Y.2d 266, 366 N.E.2d 826, 397 N.Y.S.2d 737 (1977); Cohoes
City School Dist. v. Cohoes Teachers Ass'n, 40 N.Y.2d 774, 358 N.E.2d 878, 390
N.Y.S.2d 53 (1976). Candor Cent. School Dist. and Cohoes City School Dist.,
along with several of the other cases listed immediately above are illustrative of
the general principle that, although considerations of public policy may foreclose
arbitral review of the ultimate substantive determination, issues as to compliance
with procedural agreements preliminary thereto may be submitted to arbitration.
Board of Educ. v. Three Village Teachers' Ass'n, 52 N.Y.2d 750, 417 N.E.2d 570,
436 N.Y.S.2d 276 (1980); Board of Educ. v. New York State United Teachers, 51
N.Y.2d 994, 417 N.E.2d 89, 435 N.Y.S.2d 977 (1980), Wyandanch Union Free
School Dist. v. Wyandanch Teachers Ass'n, 48 N.Y.2d 669, 397 N.E.2d 384, 421
N.Y.S.2d 873 (1979); Board of Educ. v. United Fed'n of Teachers, 46 N.Y.2d
1018, 389 N.E.2d 1057, 416 N.Y.S.2d 535 (1979); Port Washington Union Free
School Dist. v. Port Washington Teachers Ass'n, 45 N.Y.2d 411, 380 N.E.2d 280,
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408 N.Y.S.2d 453 (1978); Acting Superintendent of Schools v. United Liverpool
Faculty Ass'n, 42 N.Y.2d 509, 369 N.E.2d 746, 399 N.Y.S.2d 189 (1977).
Within the general classification of education cases that have rejected assertions
of preclusive public policy falls a subcategory of cases arising under the Taylor
Law, N.Y. CrV. SERV. LAW art. 14 (McKinney 1980), in which the court has
adopted a two-level approach to its resolution of the threshold question as to
whether there is a valid agreement to arbitrate. "Initially it must be determined
whether arbitration claims with respect to the particular subject matter are authorized
by the terms of the Taylor Law .... If it is concluded . . . that reference to
arbitration is authorized under the Taylor Law, inquiry then turns at a second
level to a determination of whether such authority was in fact exercised and whether
the parties did agree by the terms of their particular arbitration clause to refer
their differences in this specific area to arbitration." Acting Superintendent of Schools
v. United Liverpool Faculty Ass'n, 42 N.Y.2d 509, 513, 369 N.E.2d 746, 749, 399
N.Y.S.2d 189, 192 (1977). The resolution of the first-level question is based, of
course, on considerations of public policy as incorporated in the Taylor Law; that
of the second-level question turns on interpretation of the particular arbitration
clause. The following are cases in which the disposition by the court has been
predicated on this analysis: Franklin Cent. School v. Franklin Teachers Ass'n, 51
N.Y.2d 348, 414 N.E.2d 685, 434 N.Y.S.2d 185 (1980) (grievances with respect to
salary and alleged dismissal for cause held arbitrable); Mineola Union Free School
Dist. v. Mineola Teachers Ass'n, 46 N.Y.2d 568, 389 N.E.2d 111, 415 N.Y.S.2d
797 (1979) (obligation of school district to make payroll deductions for dues owed
by terminated teachers held arbitrable); Binghamton Civil Serv. Forum v. City of
Binghamton, 44 N.Y.2d 23, 374 N.E.2d 380, 403 N.Y.S.2d 482 (1978) (disciplinary
action against bribe-receiving officer held arbitrable); South Colonie Cent. School
Dist. v. Longo, 43 N.Y.2d 136, 371 N.E.2d 516, 400 N.Y.S.2d 798 (1977) (no-
reprisal provision as affecting an employee not a member of bargaining unit held
arbitrable).
The New York State Court of Appeals has also rejected assertions that con-
siderations of public policy preclude submission to arbitration in cases arising in
fields other than education. See, e.g., Town of Haverstraw v. Rockland County
Patrolmen's Benevolent Ass'n, 65 N.Y.2d 677, 481 N.E.2d 248, 491 N.Y.S.2d 616
(1985) (right of incapacitated police officer to overtime compensation as well as
regular salary); Security & Law Enforcement Employees Dist. Council 82 v. County
of Albany, 61 N.Y.2d 965, 463 N.E.2d 621, 475 N.Y.S.2d 280 (1984) (allowance
of attorney's fees for defense of county employees on criminal charges); Waks v.
Waugh, 59 N.Y.2d 723, 450 N.E.2d 231, 463 N.Y.S.2d 425 (1983) (claims arising
out of settlement agreement between attorneys and clients); Harris v. Shearson
Hayden Stone, Inc., 56 N.Y.2d 627, 435 N.E.2d 1097, 450 N.Y.S.2d 482 (1982)
(common law claims for breach of fiduciary duties); County of Rockland v. Rockland
County Unit of the Rockland County Local of the Civil Serv. Employees Ass'n,
53 N.Y.2d 741, 421 N.E.2d 849, 439 N.Y.S.2d 357 (1981) (compensation for county
employees working out of title); Bamond v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 52 N.Y.2d
957, 419 N.E.2d 872, 437 N.Y.S.2d 969 (1981) (substantial evidence of intoxication
as precluding recovery under no-fault policy); Sprinzen v. Nomberg, 46 N.Y.2d
623, 389 N.E.2d 456, 415 N.Y.S.2d 974 (1979) (enforcement of employee's covenant
not to compete); Psychoanalytic Center, Inc. v. Burns, 46 N.Y.2d 1002, 389 N.E.2d
832, 416 N.Y.S.2d 237 (1979) (computation of damages based on prior allocation
of fees as against public policy as fee-splitting in violation of regulations of
Commission of Education); Ryder Truck Lines, Inc. v. Maiorano, 44 N.Y.2d 364,
376 N.E.2d 1311, 405 N.Y.S.2d 666 (1978) (Workers' Compensation Law as bar
to submission of employee's claim to arbitration); Binghamton Civil Serv. Forum
v. City of Binghamton, 44 N.Y.2d 23, 374 N.E.2d 380, 403 N.Y.S.2d 482 (1978)
(discipline of bribe-receiving employee); Rosenblum v. Steiner, 43 N.Y.2d 896, 374
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the subject matter of a particular demand did not fall within the
embrace of the parties' agreement to arbitrate are relatively few.8'
In one case, the court held that although there existed an agreement
to arbitrate, the party seeking arbitration was not within its purview.82
N.E.2d 610, 403 N.Y.S.2d 716 (1978) (usury defense in arbitration at request of
borrower but lender may not submit usury issue to arbitration, Durst v. Abrash,
17 N.Y.2d 445, 213 N.E.2d 887, 266 N.Y.S.2d 806 (1965)); Maye v. Bluestein, 40
N.Y.2d 113, 351 N.E.2d 717, 386 N.Y.S.2d 69 (1976) (dispute as to staffing of
Firemen's Funds under legislative scheme); Riccardi v. Modern Silver Linen Supply
Co., 36 N.Y.2d 945, 335 N.E.2d 856, 373 N.Y.S.2d 551 (1975) (enforcement of
employee's covenant not to compete); Associated Gen. Contractors, N.Y. State
Chapter, Inc. v. Savin Bros., Inc., 36 N.Y.2d 957, 335 N.E.2d 859, 373 N.Y.S.2d
555 (1975) (contention that provision for liquidated damages constituted penalty in
violation of public policy rejected; arbitrator's holding that it was not penalty
upheld).
In one case, a challenge on grounds of public policy failed for lack of proof
of the factual predicate. Neirs-Folkes, Inc. v. Drake Ins. Co., 53 N.Y.2d 1038,
425 N.E.2d 875, 442 N.Y.S.2d 487 (1981) (contention that it would violate public
policy to award damages to claimant for commissions on insurance written in New
York because he was not licensed in New York did not prevent confirmation of
award which concluded that claimant had not acted as the agent in New York).
81. See Bowmer v. Bowmer, 50 N.Y.2d 288, 406 N.E.2d 760, 428 N.Y.S.2d
902 (1980) (obligation of support; broadly worded arbitration clause modified by
reference to specific issues); Fidelity & Deposit Co. v. Parsons & Whittemore
Contractors Corp., 48 N.Y.2d 127, 397 N.E.2d 380, 421 N.Y.S.2d 869 (1979) (stay
of arbitration granted because surety under performance bond did not agree to
arbitrate disputes with general contractor although contract between contractor and
subcontractor did contain such a clause); South Colonie Cent. School Dist. v. South
Colonie Teachers Ass'n, 46 N.Y.2d 521, 388 N.E.2d 727, 415 N.Y.S.2d 403 (1979)
(in disciplinary action under arbitration clause which excluded questions for which
a method of review is provided by law, where dispute falls both within broad
arbitration clause and a specified exclusion, there is no unequivocal agreement to
arbitrate); Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co. v. Bruton, 45 N.Y.2d 871, 382 N.E.2d 1355,
410 N.Y.S.2d 580 (1978) (whether vehicle involved in accident was covered under
policy in claim under uninsured motorist endorsement); Board of Educ. v. Lakeland
Fed'n of Teachers, 42 N.Y.2d 853, 366 N.E.2d 290, 397 N.Y.S.2d 630 (1977)
(questions of assignment for extra duty in connection with co-curricular activities
and interscholastic athletics, although related questions of compensation were within
agreement limiting arbitration to interpretation of express provisions of collective
bargaining agreement); Perkins & Will Partnership v. Syska & Hennessy, 41 N.Y.2d
1045, 364 N.E.2d 832, 396 N.Y.S.2d 167 (1977) (claim by architect for indemnity
from engineering consultants with respect to award in favor of owner against
architect under restrictive arbitration clause); Gangel v. DeGroot, PVBA, 41 N.Y.2d
840, 362 N.E.2d 249, 393 N.Y:S.2d 698 (1977) (dispute as to coverage of marine
insurance policy under agreement to arbitrate disputes as to "execution of the
present policy"); Redmond v. Redmond, 32 N.Y.2d 644, 295 N.E.2d 651, 342
N.Y.S.2d 851 (1973) (claims alleging fiduciary wrongdoing as within scope of
arbitration clause contained in shareholders' agreement).
82. County of Westchester v. Mahoney, 56 N.Y.2d 756, 437 N.E.2d 280, 452
N.Y.S.2d 21 (1982) (right to arbitration limited to college and union did not extend
to individual faculty members). But see Horseheads Cent. School Dist. v. Horseheads
Teachers' Ass'n, 55 N.Y.2d 949, 434 N.E.2d 262, 449 N.Y.S.2d 193 (1982).
1986] ARBITRA TION
In a much larger number of cases, however, the court has held that
the demand in question posed an issue within the scope of the
parties' agreement to arbitrate.8 3
83. Several cases may be collected under the general rubric that questions with
respect to the interpretation and application of documents executed subsequent to
the initial agreement which contained the arbitration clauses are for the arbitrator.
See, e.g., Board of Trustees v. Maplewood Teachers' Ass'n, 57 N.Y.2d 1025, 443
N.E.2d 949, 457 N.Y.S.2d 475 (1982) (whether a new contract between the parties
moots the arbitration); Inryco, Inc. v. Parsons & Whittemore Contractors Corp.,
55 N.Y.2d 666, 431 N.E.2d 291, 446 N.Y.S.2d 930 (1981) (questions concerning
the existence and terms of alleged settlement or modification agreement); Schlaifer
v. Sedlow, 51 N.Y.2d 181, 185, 412 N.E.2d 1294, 1296, 433 N.Y.S.2d 67, 69 (1980)
(questions under a general release and whether it was the product of economic
distress. "Once the parties to a broad arbitration clause have made a valid choice
of forum, as here, all questions with respect to the validity and effect of subsequent
documents purporting to work a modification or termination of the substantive
provisions of their original agreement are to be resolved by the arbitrator."); Black
& Pola v. Manes Org., Inc., 50 N.Y.2d 821, 407 N.E.2d 1345, 430 N.Y.S.2d 49
(1980) (questions as to termination or abandonment of initial contract); Elgin Nat'l
Indus., Inc. v. Somerset Constr. Co., 45 N.Y.2d 1001, 385 N.E.2d 1073, 413
N.Y.S.2d 146 (1978) (effect of subsequent modifying agreement); Opark Constr.
Corp. v. Eureka Constructors, Inc., 42 N.Y.2d 1025, 369 N.E.2d 7, 398 N.Y.S.2d
1008 (1977) (whether settlement agreement effected a release); R.H. Macy & Co.
v. National Sleep Prods., Inc., 39 N.Y.2d 268, 347 N.E.2d 887, 383 N.Y.S.2d 562
(1976) (question as to abandonment of contract); Riccardi v. Modern Silver Linen
Supply Co., 36 N.Y.2d 945, 335 N.E.2d 856, 373 N.Y.S.2d 551 (1975) (whether
third agreement superseded first two). To be distinguished from these cases would
be a situation in which it is the contention that the subsequent document effected
a cancellation or obliteration of the initial agreement, including its arbitration
clause, ab initio. See Schlaifer v. Sedlow, 51 N.Y.2d 181, 184, 412 N.E.2d 1294,
1295-96, 433 N.Y.S.2d 67, 69 (1980). In several other cases, the court has rejected
the contention that the question sought to be arbitrated falls outside the scope of
the parties' agreement. See, e.g., Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co. v. Cochrane, 64
N.Y.2d 796, 476 N.E.2d 314, 486 N.Y.S.2d 915 (1985) (whether injury is a "serious
injury" under automobile accident indemnity endorsement in claim against uninsured
motorist-as part of merits of claim); Bellevue South Assocs. v. Heckler Elec. Co.,
62 N.Y.2d 873, 467 N.E.2d 528, 478 N.Y.S.2d 864 (1984) (contention by owner
in opposition to arbitration that general contractor was really presenting claim of
subcontractor with whom owner had no agreement to arbitrate-as part of merits
of claim); Stillman v. Stillman, 55 N.Y.2d 653, 431 N.E.2d 303, 446 N.Y.S.2d
942 (1981) (interpretation of agreement to determine which questions are subject
to arbitration and which are not; see also Pearl St. Dev. Corp. v. Conduit &
Found. Corp., 41 N.Y.2d 167, 359 N.E.2d 693, 391 N.Y.S.2d 98 (1976)); Windsor
Cent. School Dist. v. Windsor Teachers Ass'n, 52 N.Y.2d 734, 417 N.E.2d 561,
436 N.Y.S.2d 267 (1980) (effect to be accorded "continuation provision" following
expiration of term of collective bargaining agreement); Lane v. Abel-Bey, 50 N.Y.2d
864, 407 N.E.2d 1337, 430 N.Y.S.2d 41 (1980) (claims of failure to enter into
employment contract, of breach of fiduciary duties, and of waste by corporate
directors); Honeoye Falls-Lima Cent. School Dist. v. Honeoye Falls-Lima Educ.
Ass'n, 49 N.Y.2d 732, 402 N.E.2d 1165, 426 N.Y.S.2d 263 (1980) (whether curricular
changes initiated by Board of Education constituted a "change in policy or practice"
necessitating compliance with contractual procedures); Rosensweig v. Brener, 49
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2. Was the Agreement Complied With?
The recent cases in the court which fall into this classification
have involved contentions that there has been a failure on the party
seeking arbitration to have complied with an alleged condition prec-
edent. A sharp distinction must be made between two discrete types
of conditions precedent-a condition precedent to access to the
arbitral process on the one hand and, on the other, a condition
precedent, in the arbitration proceeding, to the consideration or
determination of the dispute submitted to arbitration. 84 Conceptually,
the difference is readily grasped; in practice, its application is some-
times more difficult. If compliance with the specified condition is
prerequisite to access to the arbitral forum, the issue must be resolved
by the court inasmuch as, until the condition has been met, the
N.Y.2d 958, 406 N.E.2d 803, 428 N.Y.S.2d 948 (1980) (valuation of stock of
disabled or deceased shareholders and ambiguity in provisions for discharge of
trustee); Board of Educ. v. Barni, 49 N.Y.2d 311, 401 N.E.2d 912, 425 N.Y.S.2d
554 (1980) (ambiguities with respect to discharge of probationary teacher); Wyan-
danch Union Free School Dist. v. Wyandanch Teachers Ass'n, 48 N.Y.2d 669, 397
N.E.2d 384, 421 N.Y.S.2d 873 (1979) (grievances relating to Board's alleged failure
to submit a change in educational policy to an advisory professional council for
its recommendations and the imposition of certain duties on teachers in violation
of contract provisions); Board of Educ. v. Roosevelt Teachers Ass'n, 47 N.Y.2d
748, 390 N.E.2d 1176, 417 N.Y.S.2d 252 (1979) (are "per diem" teachers "sub-
stitute" teachers?); Elgin Nat'l Indus., Inc. v. Somerset Constr. Co., 45 N.Y.2d
1001, 385 N.E.2d 1073, 413 N.Y.S.2d 146 (1978) (dispute as to distribution of
escrowed joint venture proceeds); Triborough Bridge & Tunnel Auth. v. Bridge &
Tunnel Officers Benevolent Ass'n, 44 N.Y.2d 676, 376 N.E.2d 199, 405 N.Y.S.2d
39 (1978) (compensation of officers for making off-duty arrests as peace officers);
Information Sciences, Inc. v. Mohawk Data Science Corp., 43 N.Y.2d 918, 374
N.E.2d 624, 403 N.Y.S.2d 730 (1978) (claims arising out of alleged non-performance,
but not questions of collection); Walter A. Stanley & Son, Inc. v. Trustees of
Hackley School, 42 N.Y.2d 436, 366 N.E.2d 1339, 397 N.Y.S.2d 985 (1977) (whether
"dispute or disagreement in connection with the performance of the work" includes
both liability of contractor and determination of damages for delay); Nassau Ins.
Co. v. McMorris, 41 N.Y.2d 701, 363 N.E.2d 700, 395 N.Y.S.2d 149 (1977) (in
no-fault insurance arbitration, whether policy has been cancelled); Weinrott v. Carp,
32 N.Y.2d 190, 298 N.E.2d 42, 344 N.Y.S.2d 848 (1973) (fraud in the inducement
of the agreement between the parties). In another case, the court concluded that,
although another affected party was not entitled to arbitration under the particular
agreement to arbitrate, the party seeking arbitration was so entitled. Horseheads
Cent. School Dist. v. Horseheads Teachers' Ass'n., 55 N.Y.2d 949, 434 N.E.2d
262, 449 N.Y.S.2d 193 (1982) (union had right to arbitrate grievance as affecting
membership, although affected substitute teacher did not). Cf. County of Westchester
v. Mahoney, 56 N.Y.2d 756, 437 N.E.2d 280, 452 N.Y.S.2d 21 (1982) (faculty
member could not demand arbitration proceedings under agreement intended for
the college and union).
84. County of Rockland v. Primiano Constr. Co., 51 N.Y.2d 1, 8-9, 409 N.E.2d
951, 954-55, 431 N.Y.S.2d 478, 482 (1980).
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agreement to arbitrate will not have been complied with. On the
other hand, contentions that there have been failures to meet pro-
cedural requirements incident to the conduct of the arbitration pro-
ceeding itself are to be resolved by the arbitrator.
While in some cases the New York State Court of Appeals has,
itself, dealt with the merits of conditions precedent to entry upon
arbitration proceedings8 5 it has also held that questions with respect
to compliance with conditions precedent relating to the conduct of
arbitration proceedings were to be resolved by the arbitrator.8 6
85. Silverstein Properties, Inc. v. Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, Inc., 65
N.Y.2d 785, 482 N.E.2d 906, 493 N.Y.S.2d 110 (1985) (requirement of thirty days'
prior notice of claim under a restricted arbitration clause); Syracuse v. Utica Mut.
Ins. Co., 61 N.Y.2d 691, 460 N.E.2d 1085, 472 N.Y.S.2d 600 (1984) (notice-of-
claim provisions of Gen. Mun. Law §§ 50-e, 50-i do not apply to arbitration under
Ins. Law § 674 where municipality is self-insurer); Geneseo Cent. School v. Perfetto
& Whalen Constr. Corp., 53 N.Y.2d 306, 423 N.E.2d 1058, 441 N.Y.S.2d 229
(1981) (filing of notice-of-claim under Educ. Law § 3813 condition precedent to
arbitration); Board of Educ. v. Wager Constr. Corp., 37 N.Y.2d 283, 333 N.E.2d
353, 372 N.Y.S.2d 45 (1975) (notice-of-claim provisions of Educ. Law § 3813 con-
dition precedent to submission of claim in arbitration); Opan Realty Corp. v.
Pedrone, 36 N.Y.2d 943, 335 N.E.2d 854, 373 N.Y.S.2d 549 (1975) (requirement
that dispute be first submitted to partnership for determination condition precedent
to arbitration); see Liebhafsky v. Construct Assocs., Inc., 62 N.Y.2d 439, 466 N.E.2d
844, 478 N.Y.S.2d 252 (1984) (requirement for prior submission to architect of
contractor's claim for change order adjustments-no such condition found, but if
it were, resolution apparently would be for the court); New York Tel. Co. v.
Speciner, 55 N.Y.2d 1002, 434 N.E.2d 708, 449 N.Y.S.2d 472 (1982) (conditions
precedent to arbitration met); County of Rockland v. Primiano Constr. Co., 51
N.Y.2d 1, 409 N.E.2d 951, 431 N.Y.S.2d 478 (1980) (requirement for prior sub-
mission to architect of claim for delay damages-no such condition found, but if
it were, resolution would be for the court); United Nations Dev. Corp. v. Norkin
Plumbing Co., 45 N.Y.2d 358, 380 N.E.2d 253, 408 N.Y.S.2d 424 (1978) (notice-
of-claim provisions of Educ. Law § 3813 condition precedent to arbitration, but
not at issue in case); Niagara Mohawk Power Corp. v. Perfetto & Whalen Constr.
Corp., 40 N.Y.2d 986, 359 N.E.2d 436, 390 N.Y.S.2d 928 (1976) (contractual
limitation of time on submission of claim a matter for court resolution, but here
no failure to comply); Raisler Corp. v. New York City Hous. Auth., 32 N.Y.2d
274, 298 N.E.2d 91, 344 N.Y.S.2d 917 (1973) (notice-of-claim made precondition
to arbitration and compliance initially to be determined by court, but failure to
raise on timely application for a stay constitutes a waiver).
86. Diaz v. Pilgrim State Psychiatric Center, 62 N.Y.2d 693, 465 N.E.2d 32,
476 N.Y.S.2d 525 (1984) (contractual terms as to time and manner of demanding
arbitration); Monroe County Deputy Sheriff's Local 2964 v. County of Monroe,
61 N.Y.2d 1016, 463 N.E.2d 1233, 475 N.Y.S.2d 381 (1984) (procedural stipulations
which the parties had collectively agreed to follow during arbitration); Albert Alpert
& Sons, Ltd. v. John Mee, Inc., 58 N.Y.2d 950, 447 N.E.2d 82, 460 N.Y.S.2d
533 (1983) (contractual time requirements); Horseheads Cent. School Dist. v. Horse-
heads Teachers' Ass'n, 55 N.Y.2d 949, 434 N.E.2d 262, 449 N.Y.S.2d 193 (1982)
(time for filing of grievance); Dobbs Ferry Union Free School Dist. v. Dobbs Ferry
United Teachers, 53 N.Y.2d 1040, 425 N.E.2d 886, 442 N.Y.S.2d 498 (1981)
FORDHAM URBAN LA W JOURNAL
3. Is the Claim Sought to Be Arbitrated Barred by a Limitation
of Time?
In this category, the cases are very straightforward: if the claim
asserted would be barred in a judicial proceeding in consequence
of an applicable statute of limitations, it is barred in arbitration. 8
4. Was the Right to Arbitrate Waived?
Although it is not one of the three classic threshold questions to
be resolved by the courts, a defense based on alleged waiver of the
right to arbitrate is of a similar sort. This defense, too, must be
raised at the outset-and if not, it is waived. This question will be
resolved by the courts and not referred to the arbitrator." The
applicable principle is that an otherwise enforceable right to arbi-
tration may be lost on the basis of waiver in consequence of par-
ticipation in judicial proceedings for determination of the same
issue.8 9 The critical factor is the extent of the participation in the
(contractual step-by-step grievance procedures); Cooper v. Ateliers de la Motobecane,
S.A., 49 N.Y.2d 819, 404 N.E.2d 741, 427 N.Y.S.2d 619 (1980) (contractual ten-
day notice requirement); United Nations Dev. Corp. v. Norkin Plumbing Co., 45
N.Y.2d 358, 380 N.E.2d 253, 408 N.Y.S.2d 424 (1978) (provision that demand for
arbitration be made within sixty days after claim arose); Triborough Bridge &
Tunnel Auth. v. Dist. Council 37, Am. Fed'n of State, County and Mun. Employees,
44 N.Y.2d 967, 376 N.E.2d 199, 408 N.Y.S.2d 328 (1978) (four-step grievance
procedure); City School Dist. v. Poughkeepsie Pub. School Teachers' Ass'n, 35
N.Y.2d 599, 324 N.E.2d 144, 364 N.Y.S.2d 492 (1974) (ten-day time limitation on
arbitration imposed by collective bargaining agent); see Tilbury Fabrics, Inc. v.
Stillwater, Inc., 56 N.Y.2d 624, 435 N.E.2d 1093, 450 N.Y.S.2d 478 (1982) (con-
tractual one-year period of limitation).
87. Bowes & Co. v. American Druggists' Ins. Co., 61 N.Y.2d 750, 460 N.E.2d
1353, 472 N.Y.S.2d 917 (1984) (stay of arbitration of claim for rescission on ground
of fraud where demand made more than six years after execution of contract and
more than two years after discovery of fraud); United Nations Dev. Corp. v.
Norkin Plumbing Co., 45 N.Y.2d 358, 380 N.E.2d 253, 408 N.Y.S.2d 424 (1978)(bar of statute of limitations is for court to determine); Naetzker v. Brocton Cent.
School Dist., 41 N.Y.2d 929, 363 N.E.2d 351, 394 N.Y.S.2d 627 (1977) (claim
cognizable either in contract or in tort not barred by three-year statute of limitations;
six-year statute with respect to claims in contract applicable); SCM Corp. v. Fisher
Park Lane Co., 40 N.Y.2d 788, 358 N.E.2d 1024, 390 N.Y.S.2d 398 (1976) (claim
for reformation of lease barred under six-year statute of limitations); Paver &
Wildfoerster v. Catholic High School Ass'n, 38 N.Y.2d 669, 345 N.E.2d 565, 382
N.Y.S.2d 22 (1976) (claim against architects, whether in contract or malpractice,
not barred under applicable six-year statute of limitations).
88. Sherrill v. Grayco Builders, Inc., 64 N.Y.2d 261, 475 N.E.2d 772, 486
N.Y.S.2d 159 (1985).
89. Participation in arbitration proceedings may likewise constitute a waiver of
the right to judicial proceedings. Beagle v. Motor Vehicle Accident Indemnification
Corp., 19 N.Y.2d 834, 835, 227 N.E.2d 313, 314, 280 N.Y.S.2d 399, 399 (1967).
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judicial proceedings.2 In a closely-related aspect, it is to be noted
that the existence of duplicative remedies, and thus the potential
for inconsistent results, is not fatal to arbitration.9'
V. Judicial Participation In Arbitration Proceedings
Several recent cases in the New York State Court of Appeals may
be gathered under this general heading. Some have posed procedural
90. Sherrill v. Grayco Builders, Inc., 64 N.Y.2d 261, 475 N.E.2d 772, 486
N.Y.S.2d 159 (1985) (aggressive participation in judicial litigation held inconsistent
with assertion of right to arbitrate); Preiss/Breismeister Architects v. Westin Hotel
Co.-Plaza Hotel Div., 56 N.Y.2d 787, 437 N.E.2d 1154, 452 N.Y.S.2d 397 (1982)(application to courts for protective relief to maintain status quo-to restrain use
or disclosure of certain projected plans-held not to constitute waiver); Susquehanna
Valley Cent. School Dist. v. Susquehanna Valley Teachers' Ass'n, 53 N.Y.2d 917,
423 N.E.2d 817, 441 N.Y.S.2d 59 (1981) (appeal by teacher to Commissioner of
Education under Educ. Law § 310 held not a waiver); Clurman v. Clurman, 52
N.Y.2d 1036, 420 N.E.2d 385, 438 N.Y.S.2d 504 (1981) (participation in judicial
proceedings to determine arrears in support payments for years 1973-1976 held not
a waiver of right to arbitrate support issues for years 1977-1978); Susquehanna
Valley Teachers' Ass'n v. Board of Educ., 52 N.Y.2d 1034, 420 N.E.2d 400, 438
N.Y.S.2d 519 (1981) (institution of CPLR art. 75 proceeding by teacher held not
to constitute a waiver of the union's right to arbitrate); International Modular
Hous., Inc. v. Atlanta Shipping Corp., 46 N.Y.2d 1016, 389 N.E.2d 1105, 416
N.Y.S.2d 585 (1979) (assertion in judicial proceeding of counterclaims with respect
to non-arbitrable causes of action held not to constitute waiver); Allied Bldg.
Inspectors Int'l. Union of Operating Eng'rs v. Office of Labor Relations, 45 N.Y.2d
735, 380 N.E.2d 303, 408 N.Y.S.2d 476 (1978) (no waiver where only function ofjudicial proceeding was to test subject matter jurisdiction); Yonkers v. Cassidy, 44
N.Y.2d 784, 377 N.E.2d 475, 406 N.Y.S.2d 32 (1978) (litigation of dispute in
declaratory judgment action held to constitute waiver of right to arbitrate); Ro-
senblum v. Steiner, 43 N.Y.2d 896, 374 N.E.2d 610, 403 N.Y.S.2d 716 (1978) (no
waiver in consequence of failure to demand arbitration until service of supplemental
affidavit in opposition to opposing party's motion where delay explained by illness
and absence from State); City School Dist. v. Poughkeepsie Pub. School Teachers
Ass'n, 35 N.Y.2d 599, 324 N.E.2d 144, 364 N.Y.S.2d 492 (1974) (teacher's pros-
ecution of appeal to Commissioner of Education under Educ. Law § 310 held to
constitute no waiver of union's right to arbitrate); De Sapio v. Kohimeyer, 35
N.Y.2d 402, 321 N.E.2d 770, 362 N.Y.S.2d 843 (1974) (interposing a cross-claim
demanding apportionment of liability and procuring the plaintiff's deposition injudicial proceeding each held to constitute a waiver of the right to arbitrate);
Denihan v. Denihan, 34 N.Y.2d 307, 313 N.E.2d 759, 357 N.Y.S.2d 454 (1974)(litigation with respect to shareholders' agreement held not to constitute a waiver
of right to arbitrate as to different issues under the same agreement); Modular
Technics Corp. v. Graverne Contracting Corp., 32 N.Y.2d 673, 296 N.E.2d 255,
343 N.Y.S.2d 358 (1973) (under Lien Law § 35, filing of notice of mechanic's lien
held not to constitute a waiver of right to arbitrate).
91. Susquehanna Valley Cent. School Dist. v. Susquehanna Valley Teachers'
Ass'n, 53 N.Y.2d 917, 423 N.E.2d 817, 441 N.Y.S.2d 59 (1981); Port Auth. of
N.Y. & N.J. v. Port Auth. Police Benevolent Ass'n, 49 N.Y.2d 781, 403 N.E.2d
448, 426 N.Y.S.2d 725 (1980); City School Dist. v. Poughkeepsie Pub. School
Teachers Ass'n, 35 N.Y.2d 599, 324 N.E.2d 144, 364 N.Y.S.2d 492 (1974).
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issues; others have involved questions of substantive law. in some
cases, the court has made determinations with respect to procedural
aspects in the arbitration proceeding. 92 In general, however, the court
holds that questions with respect to procedural aspects of the conduct
of proceedings in arbitration are to be addressed to and resolved
by the arbitrator.93 The court has, nevertheless, resolved issues
relating to the standing of the party seeking arbitration. 94 With
respect to substantive issues which have arisen in arbitration pro-
ceedings, the New York State Court of Appeals has sometimes made
the determination." Cases in which judicial relief is sought after the
award has been made are to be clearly distinguished from those
92. Cooper v. Ateliers de la Motobecane, S.A., 57 N.Y.2d 408, 413, 442 N.E.2d
1239, 1241-42, 456 N.Y.S.2d 728, 730-31 (1982) (pre-award attachment not available
in aid of international arbitration, but a blind suggestion by way of dictum that
pre-award attachment might be available in domestic arbitration in "appropriate
circumstances"). But see 1985 N.Y. Laws ch. 253, effective January 1, 1986, au-
thorizing issuance of attachment or preliminary injunction in connection with an
arbitrable controversy. See also State Mut. Auto Ins. Co. v. Mercado, 52 N.Y.2d 840,
418 N.E.2d 663, 437 N.Y.S.2d 70 (1981) (arbitration under uninsured motorist pro-
vision must proceed under terms of the arbitration clause rather than rules of the American
Arbitration Association); Cowper Co. v. Hires-Turner Glass Co., 51 N.Y.2d 937.
415 N.E.2d 975, 434 N.Y.S.2d 987 (1980) (courts may, in the exercise of discretion,
order consolidation of arbitration proceedings); County of Sullivan v. Edward L.
Nezelek Inc., 42 N.Y.2d 123, 366 N.E.2d 72, 397 N.Y.S.2d 371 (1977) (same); Fashion
Envelopes, Inc. v. Minsky, 51 N.Y.2d 799, 412 N.E.2d 1325, 433 N.Y.S.2d 100
(1980) (demand for arbitration addressed to threats of discharge broad enough to
embrace actual discharge as well); Newton v. Booras, 50 N.Y.2d 967, 409 N.E.2d
1001, 431 N.Y.S.2d 528 (1980) (failure to observe a contractual ten-day time limit
constituted waiver of right to appoint member of arbitration panel); D.M.C. Constr.
Corp. v. Nash Steel Corp., 41 N.Y.2d 855, 362 N.E.2d 260, 393 N.Y.S.2d 709
(1977) (designation of venue by American Arbitration Association pursuant to
contract provision upheld).
93. Triborough Bridge & Tunnel Auth. v. District Council 37, Am. Fed'n of
State, County & Mun. Employees, 44 N.Y.2d 967, 380 N.E.2d 160, 408 N.Y.S.2d
328 (1978) (compliance with contractual provisions for four-step grievance procedures
to be determined by arbitrator).
94. Diaz v. Pilgrim State Psychiatric Center, 62 N.Y.2d 693, 465 N.E.2d 32,
476 N.Y.S.2d 525 (1984) (employee, as well as union, had standing to prosecute
arbitration under terms of collective bargaining agreement); County of Westchester
v. Mahoney; 56 N.Y.2d 756, 437 N.E.2d 280, 452 N.Y.S.2d 21 (1982) (arbitration
clause limited rights to demand arbitration to college and teachers union; did not
extend to individual professor).
95. Todd Shipyards Corp. v. Marine Vessel Leasing Corp., 49 N.Y.2d 809, 403
N.E.2d 964, 426 N.Y.S.2d 980 (1980) (claim that arbitration was barred because
U.S. Navy was real party-in-interest rejected); HRH Constr. Corp. v. Bethlehem
Steel Corp., 45 N.Y.2d 675, 384 N.E.2d 1289, 412 N.Y.S.2d 366 (1978) (contract
provision that determination of a particular issue in another judicial or arbitral
proceeding shall be binding constitutes a directive to arbitrator as to how a claim
in arbitration is to be resolved and not a limitation on the scope of the arbitration).
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cases in which judicial intervention is sought during the course of
the arbitration proceedings.96
VI. Judicial Review of Arbitration Awards
As one would expect, there have been many cases in which the
court has been called on to review awards in arbitration. In some,
the issue has been raised in the form of a motion to confirm the
award;97 in others, the issue has been raised in the form of a motion
to modify or to vacate the award. 9 These cases present questions
of two sorts- the first as to the scope of judicial review; the second,
assuming the question is within the scope of review, as to the standard
of that review.
A. Scope of Judicial Review
The grounds for both modification and vacatur of awards in
arbitration are explicitly delineated in Section 7511 of New York's
CPLR99 and contemplate only very limited judicial intervention. Even
these grounds are not available, however, if the determination of
the arbitrator lies wholly beyond judicial reach. In a number of
cases, the New York State Court of Appeals ruled that the question
sought to be reviewed was beyond the scope of judicial consider-
ation.10° Where public policy is advanced as a ground for vacatur
96. See infra notes 100-29 and accompanying text.
97. N.Y. Civ. PRAC. LAW § 7510 (McKinney 1980).
98. N.Y. CIv. PRAC. LAW § 7511 (McKinney 1980).
99. Id.
100. Mobil Oil Indonesia, Inc. v. Asamera Oil (Indonesia) Ltd., 43 N.Y.2d 276,
372 N.E.2d 21, 401 N.Y.S.2d 186 (1977) (no judicial review may be had of an
interlocutory determination by an arbitrator-here his determination as to which
set of procedural rules is applicable to the conduct of the arbitration proceeding-
inasmuch as there has been no "award"); Geneseo Police Benevolent Ass'n v.
Geneseo, 59 N.Y.2d 726, 450 N.E.2d 246, 463 N.Y.S.2d 440 (1983) (contention
that award is premature is not ground for vacatur of award); United Liverpool
Faculty Ass'n v. Board of Educ., 52 N.Y.2d 1038, 420 N.E.2d 386, 438 N.Y.S.2d
505 (1981) (proceeding to vacate award cannot be used as a vehicle to challenge
arbitrability of claim); Central Gen. Hosp. v. Hanover Ins. Co. 49 N.Y.2d 950,
406 N.E.2d 739, 428 N.Y.S.2d 881 (1980) (assertion of newly discovered evidence
no ground for vacatur of award); Board of Higher Educ. v. Brown, 49 N.Y.2d
935, 406 N.E.2d 438, 428 N.Y.S.2d 621 (1980) (having proceeded to arbitration,
losing party may not seek vacatur of award on ground that claim was not arbitrable);
Board of Educ. v. Patchogue-Medford Congress of Teachers, 48 N.Y.2d 812, 399
N.E.2d 1143, 424 N.Y.S.2d 122 (1979) (whether a prior award in arbitration
constitutes a bar to the relief sought is an issue for the arbitrator, not the courts);
Lange-Finn Constr. Co. v. C.R. Joyce & Sons, Inc., 41 N.Y.2d 814, 361 N.E.2d
1045, 393 N.Y.S.2d 397 (1977) (on motion to confirm an award, court cannot
consider contentions beyond issue submitted for arbitration).
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of an award, the courts will address and decide this issue, not-
withstanding that no application for a stay was made on this ground.10'
B. Standards of Judicial Review
The cases in this classification are numerous, and a further sub-
division of subject matter will be useful. In two classes of cases,
the standard of review is slightly different and contemplates a bit
more judicial supervision than usual.
1. Judicial Review of Awards in No-Fault Insurance Arbitration
Here, arbitration on the part of the insurer is compulsory and,
once invoked, is subject to statutory and regulatory prescription.
Further, the arbitration process proceeds in two stages, first an initial
award and then review of that award by a master arbitrator. It is
normally the award of the master arbitrator which is the target of
judicial review, and the attention of the court must be focused on
restrictions on the scope of his review. 102 Inasmuch as the arbitration
101. Candor Cent. School Dist. v. Candor Teachers Ass'n, 42 N.Y.2d 266, 270
n.*, 366 N.E.2d 826, 828 n.*, 397 N.Y.S.2d 737, 738 n.* (1977); cf. Silverman v.
Benmor Coats, Inc., 61 N.Y.2d 299, 309, 461 N.E.2d 1261, 1266-67, 473 N.Y.S.2d
774, 779-80 (1984).
102. See N.Y. ADMIN. CODE tit. x, § 65.17(i) (Williams 1985). The following
are illustrative of rulings with respect to judicial review of no-fault insurance awards.
Aleman v. Empire Mut. Ins. Co., 62 N.Y.2d 1017, 468 N.E.2d 676, 479 N.Y.S.2d
494 (1984) (award of master arbitrator vacated where he engaged in factual review
and impermissibly weighed the evidence); Smith v. Firemen's Ins. Co., 55 N.Y.2d
224, 433 N.E.2d 509, 448 N.Y.S.2d 444 (1982) (court upheld vacatur of initial
award by master arbitrator as grounded in his conclusion that initial award was
erroneous as a matter of law); Mott v. State Farm Ins. Co., 55 N.Y.2d 224, 433
N.E.2d 509, 448 N.Y.S.2d 444 (1982) (award of master arbitrator-vacating initial
award of benefits-vacated on ground that it was based on master arbitrator's
review of procedural and factual matters outside his powers of review); Petrofsky
v. Allstate Ins. Co., 54 N.Y.2d 207, 429 N.E.2d 755, 445 N.Y.S.2d 77 (1981)
(award of master arbitrator based on factual determinations vacated); Bamond v.
Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 52 N.Y.2d 957, 419 N.E.2d 872, 437 N.Y.S.2d 969
(1981) (award of master arbitrator affirming initial award of benefits confirmed);
McKenna v. County of Nassau Office of County Attorney, 51 N.Y.2d 902, 415
N.E.2d 979, 434 N.Y.S.2d 991 (1980) (award of first-party benefits without deduction
of payments to claimant under Gen. Mun. Law § 207-c not so irrational as to
warrant vacatur); Cohn v. Royal Globe Ins. Co., 49 N.Y.2d 942, 406 N.E.2d 739,
428 N.Y.S.2d 881 (1980) (arbitrator's interpretation of statute specifying form of
notice of cancellation of insurance policy upheld; notice valid); Furstenberg v.
Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 49 N.Y.2d 757, 403 N.E.2d 170, 426 N.Y.S.2d 465
(1980) (same); Levine v. Zurich Am. Ins. Co., 49 N.Y.2d 907, 405 N.E.2d 675,
428 N.Y.S.2d 193 (1980) (factual determination that jury verdict in third-party
action did not incorporate "basic economic loss" sustained as having a "basis in
reason"); Fresh Meadows Medical Assocs. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 49 N.Y.2d
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process is compulsory, the standard of judicial review includes de-
termination of " 'whether the award is supported by evidence or
other basis in reason.' 1103 As will shortly appear, no such inquiry
has any part in the review of awards in voluntary arbitration.
2. Judicial Review of Awards in Arbitration Proceedings Under
the Taylor Law
In arbitration under agreements which derive their vitality from
the Taylor Law,1°4 on post-award review, the applicant seeking va-
catur of the award may raise the first-level question, "whether
arbitration claims with respect to the particular subject matter are
authorized by the terms of the Taylor Law." This issue involves
considerations of public policy as reflected in the statute and, as
noted above, is not waived by failure to raise it on a timely ap-
plication for a stay. °5
In general, the standard of judicial scrutiny in this area of com-
pulsory arbitration is the same as that in other areas of non-voluntary
arbitration-whether the award is supported by evidence or other
basis in reason; that is, whether it is "rational."' ' 06
3. Standard of Judicial Review in General
As indicated, judicial review of awards in arbitration is very limited
indeed. The New York State Court of Appeals has stated that the
only grounds for vacatur of an award are those enumerated in
Section 7511 of New York's CPLR.'10 These provisions of New
93, 400 N.E.2d 303, 424 N.Y.S.2d 361 (1979) (court held that arbitrator, in making
award of attorney's fees to claimant, could include services in preparation of claim
for allowance); Garcia v. Federal Ins. Co., 46 N.Y.2d 1040, 389 N.E.2d 1066, 416
N.Y.S.2d 544 (1979) (arbitrator's requirement of conviction under Vehicle & Traffic
Law § 1192 for denial of benefits on ground of intoxication not so irrational as
to require vacatur).
103. Petrofsky v. Allstate Ins. Co., 54 N.Y.2d 207, 211, 429 N.E.2d 755, 757,
445 N.Y.S.2d 77, 79-80 (1981) (quoting Mount St. Mary's Hosp. v. Catherwood,
26 N.Y.2d 493, 260 N.E.2d 508, 311 N.Y.S.2d 863 (1970)); Smith v. Firemen's
Ins. Co., 55 N.Y.2d 224, 231, 433 N.E.2d 509, 511, 448 N.Y.S.2d 444, 446 (1982)
(quoting Petrofsky).
104. N.Y. CIv. SERV. LAW art. 14, § 201-14 (McKinney 1980).
105. Candor Cent. School Dist. v. Candor Teachers Ass'n, 42 N.Y.2d 266, 270
n.8, 366 N.E.2d 826, 828 n.*, 397 N.Y.S.2d 737, 738 n.* (1977).
106. City of Buffalo v. Rinaldo, 41 N.Y.2d 764, 364 N.E.2d 817, 396 N.Y.S.2d 152
(1977).
107. N.Y. CIv. PRAC. LAW § 7511 (McKinney 1980). Section 7511, entitled
"Vacating or modifying award," provides:
(a) When application made. An application to vacate or modify an
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York's CPLR envisage only the most minimal judicial disturbance
of the resolution of controversies reached in arbitration pursuant to
the voluntary, express agreement of the parties. 08 The very strong
policy against judicial intrusion on the results of arbitration, artic-
ulated by both the legislature and the courts, finds expression in
several aspects. It is declared that the courts will not consider the
award may be made by a party within ninety days after its delivery to
him.
(b) Grounds for vacating.
I. The award shall be vacated on the application of a party who either
participated in the arbitration or was served with a notice of intention
to arbitrate if the court finds that the rights of that party were prejudiced
by:
(i) corruption, fraud or misconduct in procuring the award; or
(ii) partiality of an arbitrator appointed as a neutral, except where
the award was by confession; or
(iii) an arbitrator, or agency or person making the award exceeded
his power or so imperfectly executed it that a final and definite award
upon the subject matter submitted was not made; or
(iv) failure to follow the procedure of this article, unless the party
applying to vacate the award continued with the arbitration with notice
of the defect and without objection.
2. The award shall be vacated on the application of a party who neither
participated in the arbitration nor was served with a notice of intention
to arbitrate if the court finds that:
(i) the rights of that party were prejudiced by one of the grounds
specified in paragraph one; or
(ii) a valid agreement to arbitrate was not made; or
(iii) the agreement to arbitrate had not been complied with; or (iv)
the arbitrated claim was barred by limitation under subdivision (b) of
section 7502.
(c) Grounds for modifying. The court shall modify the award if:
I. there was a miscalculation of figures or a mistake in the description
of any person, thing or property referred to in the award; or
2. the arbitrators have awarded upon a matter not submitted to them
and the award may be corrected without affecting the merits of the
decision upon the issues submitted; or
3. the award is imperfect in a matter of form, not affecting the merits
of the controversy.
(d) Rehearing. Upon vacating an award, the court may order a rehearing
and determination of all or any of the issues either before the same
arbitrator or before a new arbitrator appointed in accordance with this
article. Time in any provision limiting the time for a hearing or award
shall be measured from the date of such order or rehearing, whichever
is appropriate, or a time may be specified by the court.
(e) Confirmation. Upon the granting of a motion to modify, the court
shall confirm the award as modified; upon the denial of a motion to
vacate or modify, it shall confirm the award.
Id.; see Civil Serv. Employees Ass'n v. State, 56 N.Y.2d 663, 436 N.E.2d 1333,
451 N.Y.S.2d 731 (1982).
108. E.g., N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAW § 7511 (McKinney 1980).
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merits of the dispute, that errors of law or fact are beyond the
reach of judicial review, and that interpretation and construction of
writings is for the arbitrator and not for the courts. The court not
infrequently states that it will vacate an award only if it is "completely
irrational." The vitality of this latter test is itself subject to serious
question, however, when it is recognized, as Judge Kaye recently
observed, that a "totally irrational result, [has] yet to be found by
this court."1 °9
The relevant holdings of the court in this area may be assembled
in categories: (a) "the court shall not consider whether the claim
with respect to which arbitration is sought is tenable, or otherwise
pass upon the merits of the dispute;"30 (b) errors of law and fact
are beyond judicial review;"' (c) questions of interpretation and
109. Silverman v. Benmor Coats, Inc., 61 N.Y.2d 299, 312, 461 N.E.2d 1261,
1268, 473 N.Y.S.2d 774, 781 (1984) (Kaye, J., dissenting).
110. N.Y. Crv. PRAc. LAW § 7501 (McKinney 1980). See, e.g., Long Island
Univ. Faculty Fed'n v. Board of Trustees, 60 N.Y.2d 855, 458 N.E.2d 381, 470
N.Y.S.2d 140 (1983) (general proposition); Spanish Gardens Co. v. Local 32B-32J
Serv. Employees Int'l Union, 56 N.Y.2d 826, 438 N.E.2d 104, 452 N.Y.S.2d 571
(1982) (same); I.J.S. Fabrics, Inc. v. Dan River, Inc., 56 N.Y.2d 755, 437 N.E.2d
260, 452 N.Y.S.2d 1 (1982) (whether seller retained and thereafter exercised right
to accept sales note at home office a question for the arbitrator); Dunseith v.
Travia, 56 N.Y.2d 582, 435 N.E.2d 405, 450 N.Y.S.2d 188 (1982) (arbitrator to
decide which version of Code of National Association of Securities Dealers is
applicable); MPG Capital Corp. v. Nick, 56 N.Y.2d 515, 434 N.E.2d 1329, 449
N.Y.S.2d 951 (1982) (arbitrators to determine whether 1973 or 1978 edition of
Code of National Association of Securities Dealers is applicable); Board of Educ.
v. Cattaraugus Teacher's Ass'n, 55 N.Y.2d 951, 434 N.E.2d 262, 449 N.Y.S.2d
193 (1982) (general proposition); Dobbs Ferry Union Free School Dist. v. Dobbs
Ferry United Teachers, 53 N.Y.2d 1040, 425 N.E.2d 886, 442 N.Y.S.2d 498 (1981)
(arbitrator to determine whether there was compliance with contractual grievance
procedures); County of Rockland v. Rockland County Unit of the Civil Serv.
Employees Ass'n, 53 N.Y.2d 741, 421 N.E.2d 849, 439 N.Y.S.2d 357 (1981)
(arbitrator to determine existence of positions to which grievants were assigned to
perform out-of-title work); Board of Educ. v. Barni, 51 N.Y.2d 894, 415 N.E.2d
963, 434 N.Y.S.2d 975 (1980) (arbitrator to decide whether procedures preliminary
to filling vacancy were followed); Ryder Truck Lines, Inc. v. Maiorano, 44 N.Y.2d
364, 376 N.E.2d 1311, 405 N.Y.S.2d 666 (1978) (general statement); City of Buffalo
v. Rinaldo, 41 N.Y.2d 764, 364 N.E.2d 817, 396 N.Y.S.2d 152 (1977) (arbitrators
to determine municipal fiscal priorities); Praetorian Realty Corp. v. Presidential
Towers Residence, Inc., 40 N.Y.2d 897, 357 N.E.2d 1006, 389 N.Y.S.2d 351 (1976)
(arbitrator to determine whether claims are barred by merger doctrine in real property
law); Board of Educ. v. Yonkers Fed'n of Teachers, 40 N.Y.2d 268, 276, 353
N.E.2d 569, 573, 386 N.Y.S.2d 657, 661 (1976) (general statement); Nationwide
Gen. Ins. Co. v. Investors Ins. Co., 37 N.Y.2d 91, 95, 332 N.E.2d 333, 335, 371
N.Y.S.2d 463, 466 (1975) (general statement).
Ill. See Allen v. New York State, 53 N.Y.2d 694, 696, 421 N.E.2d 498, 499,
439 N.Y.S.2d 103, 104 (1981); Sprinzen v. Nomberg, 46 N.Y.2d 623, 629, 389
N.E.2d 456, 458, 415 N.Y.S.2d 974, 977 (1979); Binghamton Civil Serv. Forum
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construction of writings are for the arbitrator and are not subject
to judicial review;"1 2 (d) although in compulsory arbitration the court
will set aside an award which the court concludes cannot be rationally
supported on the record; in voluntary arbitration, the court will not
vacate an award on the ground of irrationality unless it is "completely
irrational;" and as noted, no award has yet come before the court
v. Binghamton, 44 N.Y.2d 23, 28, 374 N.E.2d 380, 383, 403 N.Y.S.2d 482, 485
(1978); American Ins. Co. v. Messinger, 43 N.Y.2d 184, 191, 371 N.E.2d 798,
802, 401 N.Y.S.2d 36, 40 (1977); Candor Cent. School Dist. v. Candor Teachers
Ass'n, 42 N.Y.2d 266, 271, 366 N.E.2d 826, 828, 397 N.Y.S.2d 737, 739, (1977);
Associated Gen. Contractors, N.Y. State Chapter, Inc. v. Savin Bros., Inc., 36
N.Y.2d 957, 959, 335 N.E.2d 859, 859, 373 N.Y.S.2d 555, 556 (1975); Wolff &
Munier, Inc. v. Diesel Constr. Co., 36 N.Y.2d 750, 752, 329 N.E.2d 662, 663,
368 N.Y.S.2d 828, 829 (1975); Raisler Corp. v. New York City Hous. Auth., 32
N.Y.2d 274, 282, 284, 298 N.E.2d 91, 94, 96, 344 N.Y.S.2d 917, 923, 924 (1973).
In general, questions of law which arise during the course of the arbitration
proceedings are to be determined by the arbitrator. See City School Dist. v.
Tonawanda Educ. Ass'n, 63 N.Y.2d 846, 472 N.E.2d 34, 482 N.Y.S.2d 258 (1984)
(preclusive effect to be accorded prior award in arbitration); Board of Educ. v.
Patchogue-Medford Congress of Teachers, 48 N.Y.2d 812, 399 N.E.2d 1143, 424
N.Y.S.2d 122 (1979) (preclusive effect to be accorded prior award in arbitration);
Country-Wide Ins. Co. v. Barrios, 48 N.Y.2d 831, 399 N.E.2d 1153, 424 N.Y.S.2d
132 (1979) (entitlement of claimant under statute to attorney's fees on appeal).
112. Albany County Sheriff's Local 775 of Council 82 v. County of Albany,
63 N.Y.2d 654, 656, 468 N.E.2d 695, 696, 479 N.Y.S.2d 513, 514 (1984) ("The
applicable principle is that an arbitrator's award 'will not be vacated even though
the court concludes that his interpretation of the agreement misconstrues or dis-
regards its plain meaning ... unless it is violative of a strong public policy, or
is totally irrational, or exceeds a specifically enumerated limitation'.") (citation
omitted); Nyack Bd. of Educ. v. Nyack Teachers Ass'n, 55 N.Y.2d 959, 434 N.E.2d
264, 449 N.Y.S. 194 (1982) (general proposition); Adelstein v. Ortiz Funeral Home
Corp., 52 N.Y.2d 997, 419 N.E.2d 1079, 438 N.Y.S.2d 80 (1981) (general prop-
osition); Board of Educ. v. New York State United Teachers, 51 N.Y.2d 994, 996,
417 N.E.2d 89, 90, 435 N.Y.S.2d 977, 978 (1980) (ambiguities in provisions alleged
to have been violated); Board of Educ. v. Deer Park Teachers Ass'n, 50 N.Y.2d
1011, 409 N.E.2d 1356, 431 N.Y.S.2d 682 (1980) (interpretation, meaning, and
application of substantive provisions of agreement); Local 1179 Amalgamated Transit
Union v. Green Bus Lines, Inc., 50 N.Y.2d 1007, 1009, 409 N.E.2d 1354, 1355,
431 N.Y.S.2d 680, 681 (1980) ("[Clourts may not overturn an award because they
believe the arbitrator has misconstrued the apparent, or even the obvious, meaning
of the contract"); Rochester City School Dist. v. Rochester Teachers Ass'n, 41
N.Y.2d 578, 582, 362 N.E.2d 977, 981, 394 N.Y.S.2d 179, 182 (1977) ("[Clourts
may not set aside an award because they feel that the arbitrator's interpretation
disregards the apparent, or even the plain, meaning of the words . . ."); Associated
Gen. Contractors, N.Y. State Chapter, Inc. v. Savin Bros., Inc., 36 N.Y.2d 957,
335 N.E.2d 859, 373 N.Y.S.2d 555 (1975) (whether provision for liquidating damages
was a penalty; arbitrator's conclusion that it was not a penalty and thus enforceable
upheld); W.M. Girvan, Inc. v. Robilotto, 33 N.Y.2d 425, 309 N.E.2d 422, 353
N.Y.S.2d 958 (1974) (interpretation of provision prohibiting discharge or suspension
without "just cause"); Cooper v. Abrams, 32 N.Y.2d 865, 299 N.E.2d 896, 346
N.Y.S.2d 530 (1973) (construction of substantive provisions of the agreement).
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which it has found to be completely irrational;" 3 and (e) as dif-
ferentiated from rulings on matters of substance, the court has made
a few rulings with respect to judicial review of procedural deter-
minations. '14
Perhaps indicative of the extent to which the court will go in leaving to the
arbitrator all questions involving the interpretation or construction of contract
provisions are the following cases: Stillman v. Stillman, 55 N.Y.2d 653, 431 N.E.2d
303, 446 N.Y.S.2d 942 (1981) (leaving to the arbitrator to determine which issues
are subject to arbitration, that is, the scope of the agreement to arbitrate); Pearl
St. Dev. Corp. v. Conduit and Found. Corp., 41 N.Y.2d 167, 359 N.E.2d 693,
391 N.Y.S.2d 98 (1976) (leaving to arbitrator to interpret agreement to determine
whether there was a condition precedent to access to the arbitral forum which, if
found, would be for resolution by the court).
113. Town of Haverstraw v. Rockland County Patrolmen's Benevolent Ass'n,
65 N.Y.2d 677, 481 N.E.2d 248, 491 N.Y.S.2d 616 (1985) (award of overtime
compensation as well as regular salary to incapacitated police officer); Diaz v.
Pilgrim State Psychiatric Center, 62 N.Y.2d 693, 465 N.E.2d 32, 476 N.Y.S.2d
525 (1984) (arbitrator's conclusion that there had not been compliance with con-
tractual provisions as to time and manner of demand); McKenna v. County of
Nassau, 61 N.Y.2d 739, 460 N.E.2d 1348, 472 N.Y.S.2d 913 (1984) (grant of
interest on an award against a municipal self-insurer); Central Squares Teachers
Ass'n v. Board of Educ., 52 N.Y.2d 918, 919, 419 N.E.2d 341, 341, 437 N.Y.S.2d
663, 663 (1981) (award with reference to assignment of teachers to cafeteria duty.
"The path of analysis, proof and persuasion by which the arbitrator reached this
conclusion is beyond judicial scrutiny."); Civil Serv. Employees Ass'n v. County
of Niagara, 49 N.Y.2d 899, 405 N.E.2d 706, 428 N.Y.S.2d 225 (1980) (finding
that grievant was a member of the bargaining unit); Yonkers Fed'n of Teachers
v. Board of Educ., 46 N.Y.2d 725, 385 N.E.2d 1300, 413 N.Y.S.2d 373 (1978)
(teachers found to be employees within bargaining unit); Yonkers Fed'n of Teachers
v. Board of Educ., 44 N.Y.2d 752, 376 N.E.2d 1326, 405 N.Y.S.2d 681 (1978)
(award reinstating teachers with full benefits, back pay, and interest not irrational,
notwithstanding assertions of municipal inability to pay); Civil Serv. Employees
Ass'n v. Lombard, 41 N.Y.2d 915, 362 N.E.2d 1213, 394 N.Y.S.2d 410 (1977)
(finding that sheriff did not have "just and sufficient cause" to discharge deputy
sheriff); Rochester City School Dist. v. Rochester Teachers Ass'n, 41 N.Y.2d 578,
582, 362 N.E.2d 977, 981, 394 N.Y.S.2d 179, 182 (1977) (general statement).
114. Cady v. Aetna Life & Casualty Co., 61 N.Y.2d 594, 463 N.E.2d 1214, 475
N.Y.S.2d 362 (1984) (Superintendent of Insurance had no authority to reduce ninety-
day period specified in CPLR 7511 to fifty-one days for judicial review of awards
in no-fault insurance cases); Silverman v. Benmor Coats, Inc., 61 N.Y.2d 299, 461
N.E.2d 1261, 473 N.Y.S.2d 774 (1984) (unless the entire controversy is non-arbitrable,
participation in arbitration not a waiver of the right to seek vacatur of the award
as in excess of arbitrator's power); Thermasol, Ltd. v. Dreiske, 52 N.Y.2d 1069,
420 N.E.2d 401, 438 N.Y.S.2d 520, cert. denied, 454 U.S. 826 (1981) (vacatur on
ground that party never received demand denied where party received adequate
notice of arbitration by mail in accordance with the rule of the American Arbitration
Association); North Colonie Cent. School Dist. v. North Colonie Teachers' Ass'n,
46 N.Y.2d 965, 389 N.E.2d 142, 415 N.Y.S.2d 829 (1979) (submission to arbitrator
of cited authority without advice that it had been modified not ground for vacatur
of award); PPX Enterprises, Inc. v. Ducale Edizione Musicali, 42 N.Y.2d 897, 366
N.E.2d 1341, 397 N.Y.S.2d 987 (1977) (vacatur granted on ground of failure to
follow procedure under CPLR art. 75 where, because of inartful administration
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C. Judicial Review of Remedies
As a separate aspect of the judicial review of awards in arbitration,
reference should be made to the cases in which the attack is directed
at the remedy granted by the arbitrator as distinguished from the
determination of the substantive right of the parties. At the threshold,
it should be noted that if it appears at the outset of the arbitration
that there is a possibility the arbitrator might grant an impermissible
remedy, it is not grounds to stay the arbitration; the arbitration
goes forward, and any challenge to the remedy must await issuance
of the award." 5 A number of cases stand for the closely-related
proposition that although relief by way of specific performance with
respect to the issue tendered, such as grant of tenure, cannot be
awarded, an award of alternative relief will be upheld."' 6
Generally speaking, the court recognizes that the arbitrator has
by American Arbitration Association, there was a failure to give notice of hearing
as required by CPLR 7506 (b)); Professional Staff Congress/City Univ. of N.Y.
v. Board of Higher Educ., 39 N.Y.2d 319, 347 N.E.2d 918, 383 N.Y.S.2d 592
(1976) (no judicial review of arbitrator's determination that personnel records of
college were confidential); Friedman v. Weinberger, 31 N.Y.2d 1048, 294 N.E.2d
856, 342 N.Y.S.2d 71 (1973) (court clarified terms of award to give effect to
intention of arbitrators).
115. Board of Educ. v. Connetquot Teachers Ass'n, 60 N.Y.2d 840, 458 N.E.2d
373, 470 N.Y.S.2d 132 (1983) (general proposition); Nyack Bd. of Educ. v. Nyack
Teachers Ass'n, 55 N.Y.2d 959, 434 N.E.2d 264, 449 N.Y.S.2d 194 (1982) (that
arbitrator cannot grant relief requested is not ground for a stay); Board of Educ.
v. Three Village Teachers' Ass'n, 52 N.Y.2d 750, 417 N.E.2d 570, 436 N.Y.S.2d
276 (1980) (permissible remedy could be fashioned for a violation of procedural
prerequisites to adoption of a reading management system); Board of Educ. v.
Barni, 51 N.Y.2d 894, 415 N.E.2d 963, 434 N.Y.S.2d 975 (1980) (that requested
remedy may be beyond power of arbitrator is not ground for stay); Board of Educ.
of Lakeland Cent. School Dist. v. Barni, 49 N.Y.2d 311, 401 N.E.2d 912, 425
N.Y.S.2d 554 (1980) (that arbitrator might fashion a remedy in excess of his powers
under arbitration clause is not grounds for stay).
116. Northeast Cent. School Dist. v. Webutuck Teachers Ass'n, 52 N.Y.2d 717,
417 N.E.2d 567, 436 N.Y.S.2d 273 (1980) (although tenure may not be granted,
reinstatement for further year of probation is proper remedy for violation of
procedural requirements preliminary to tenure determination); Vestal Cent. Schools
v. Vestal Teachers Ass'n, 46 N.Y.2d 746, 386 N.E.2d 261, 413 N.Y.S.2d 653 (1978)
(although arbitrator cannot award tenure, he may grant relief for violation of
provisions apart from tenure); Candor Cent. School Dist. v. Candor Teachers Ass'n,
42 N.Y.2d 266, 366 N.E.2d 826, 397 N.Y.S.2d 737 (1977) (arbitrator may grant
relief short of tenure for violation of pre-tenure procedures); Fayetteville-Manlius
Cent. School Dist. v. Fayetteville-Manlius Teachers Ass'n, 41 N.Y.2d 818, 361
N.E.2d 1045, 393 N.Y.S.2d 397 (1977) (same proposition); Cohoes City School
Dist. v. Cohoes Teachers Ass'n, 40 N.Y.2d 774, 358 N.E.2d 878, 390 N.Y.S.2d
53 (1976) (same proposition); Board of Educ. v. Bellmore-Merrick United Secondary
Teachers, Inc., 39 N.Y.2d 167, 347 N.E.2d 603, 383 N.Y.S.2d 242 (1976) (same
proposition).
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broad discretion to fashion remedies" 7 and that this discretion is
not limited to the remedies sought by the parties." 8 In a number
of non-tenure cases, the remedy awarded by the arbitrator was
upheld." 9 However, where the parties have imposed an express lim-
itation on the remedies which may be granted by the arbitrator, the
court will enforce the limitation.12° The New York State Court of
117. Board of Educ. v. Yonkers Fed'n of Teachers, 40 N.Y.2d at 268, 276, 353
N.E.2d at 569, 573, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 657, 661 (1976).
118. Board of Educ. v. Bellmore-Merrick United Secondary Teachers, 39 N.Y.2d
167, 172, 347 N.E.2d 603, 606, 383 N.Y.S.2d 242, 245 (1976), cited with approval
in Port Washington Union Free School Dist. v. Port Washington Teachers Ass'n,
45 N.Y.2d 411, 418, 380 N.E.2d 280, 283, 408 N.Y.S.2d 453, 456 (1978).
119. Turner v. Booth Memorial Hosp., 63 N.Y.2d 633, 468 N.E.2d 690, 479
N.Y.S.2d 508 (1984) (direction to hospital to restore laundry facility for violation
of contractual provisions by discontinuing laundry and contracting out); Security
and Law Enforcement Employees, Dist. Council 82 v. County of Albany, 61 N.Y.2d
965, 463 N.E.2d 621, 475 N.Y.S.2d 280 (1984) (award of back pay and attorney's
fees in defense of criminal charges for impermissible suspension); Tilbury Fabrics,
Inc. v. Stillwater, Inc., 56 N.Y.2d 624, 435 N.E.2d 1093, 450 N.Y.S.2d 478 (1982)
(mere possibility that award included consequential damages-award of which was
expressly prohibited in contract-not sufficient to disturb award); Allen v. New
York State, 53 N.Y.2d 694, 421 N.E.2d 498, 439 N.Y.S.2d 103 (1981) (amendment
of remedy in disciplinary proceeding over that initially proposed by State); De
Paulo v. Albany, 49 N.Y.2d 994, 406 N.E.2d 1064, 429 N.Y.S.2d 171 (1980)
(suspension only of police officer indicted for official misconduct who pleaded
guilty to disorderly conduct); Board of Educ. v. Hess, 49 N.Y.2d 145, 400 N.E.2d
329, 424 N.Y.S.2d 389 (1979) (reinstatement of former teacher for violation of
evaluation procedures); Fresh Meadows Medical Assoc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co.,
49 N.Y.2d 93, 400 N.E.2d 303, 424 N.Y.S.2d 361 (1979) (award of attorney's fees,
including services in preparation for claim of allowance of attorney's fees); Psy-
choanalytic Center, Inc. v. Burns, 46 N.Y.2d 1002, 389 N.E.2d 832, 416 N.Y.S.2d
237 (1979) (award of damages based on prior allocation of partnership fees); Board
of Educ. v. Yonkers Fed'n of Teachers, 46 N.Y.2d 727, 385 N.E.2d 1297, 413
N.Y.S.2d 370 (1978) (fixing of procedures for granting sabbatical leaves); Board
of Educ. v. Niagara-Wheatfield Teachers Ass'n, 46 N.Y.2d 553, 389 N.E.2d 104,
415 N.Y.S.2d 790 (1979) (lump-sum award not punitive on ground no precise
arithmetical formula stated; sexual discrimination in hiring); Port Washington Union
Free School Dist. v. Port Washington Teachers Ass'n, 45 N.Y.2d 746, 380 N.E.2d
310, 408 N.Y.S.2d 484 (1978) (for violation of agreement as to priorities in filling
vacancies, arbitrator may fill vacancy where only one person qualified); North
Syracuse Cent. School Dist. v. North Syracuse Educ. Ass'n, 45 N.Y.2d 195, 379
N.E.2d 1193, 408 N.Y.S.2d 64 (1978) (negative action of voters no bar to rein-
statement of teachers discharged in violation of contractual job security provision);
Rochester City School Dist. v. Rochester Teachers Ass'n, 41 NY.2d 578, 362 N.E.2d
977, 394 N.Y.S.2d 179 (1977) (determination that leaves of absence should be
granted up to one percent of teachers employed); SCM Corp. v. Fisher Park Lane
Co., 40 N.Y.2d 788, 358 N.E.2d 1024, 390 N.Y.S.2d 398 (1976) (reformation of
lease); Ganser v. New York Tel. Co., 34 N.Y.2d 717, 313 N.E.2d 342, 356 N.Y.S.2d
863 (1974) (award sustaining discharge of employee); British Overseas Airways Corp.
v. International Ass'n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers, 32 N.Y.2d 823, 299
N.E.2d 258, 345 N.Y.S.2d 1014 (1973) (direction for promotion of employee).
120. Local 345 of Retail Store Employees Union v. Heinrich Motors, Inc., 63
N.Y.2d 985, 473 N.E.2d 247, 483 N.Y.S.2d 997 (1984).
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Appeals has recently made it clear that if the parties intend to impose
limits or restrictions on the authority of an arbitrator to fashion
remedies, the limitation or restriction must be contained in the
arbitration clause itself; the court will not give effect to limitations
incorporated in the substantive provision of the contract. 2 But,
even if the limitation is incorporated in the arbitration clause, its
benefit will be waived unless the limitation is brought to the attention
of the arbitrator or timely raised in the judicial proceeding. 2 2 If
the limitation or restriction is contained in the substantive provisions
of the contract, it constitutes only a direction to the arbitrator as
to how to conduct the arbitration proceedings, 2 1 for error in the
observance of which there could be no judicial relief inasmuch as
that would involve the courts in the merits of the dispute in violation
of the legislative mandate.'24 In a few cases, the court has addressed
procedural aspects of the awarding of remedies. 25
D. Judicial Review of the Status or Conduct of the Arbitrator
In this category fall the cases in which attempts are made to
vacate awards on the ground that the rights of the applicant were
prejudiced by "misconduct in procuring the award" or "partiality
of an arbitrator."' This has not proven to be a rewarding avenue
of attack on awards. In many cases, the contention advanced as
121. Turner v Booth Memorial Hosp., 63 N.Y.2d 633, 634-35, 468 N.E.2d 690,
691, 479 N.Y.S.2d 508, 509 (1984) (rule applicable to all arbitration); Board of
Educ. v. Dover-Wingdale Teachers' Ass'n, 61 N.Y.2d 913, 463 N.E.2d 32, 474
N.Y.S.2d 716 (1984) (labor relations public sector); Silverman v. Benmor Coats,
Inc., 61 N.Y.2d 299, 461 N.E.2d 1261, 473 N.Y.S.2d 774 (1984) (commercial
arbitration).
122. Silverman v. Benmor Coats, Inc., 61 N.Y.2d 299, 310-11, 461 N.E.2d 1261,
1267, 473 N.Y.S.2d 774, 780-81 (1984).
123 Cf. HRH Constr. Corp. v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 45 N.Y.2d 675, 384
N.E.2d 1289, 412 N.Y.S.2d 366 (1978).
124. Silverman v. Benmor Coats, Inc., 61 N.Y.2d 299, 307, 461 N.E.2d 1261,
1265-66, 473 N.Y.S.2d 774, 778-79 (1984).
125. Id. at 310, 461 N.E.2d at 1267, 473 N.Y.S.2d at 780 (that there may be
third persons, not parties to the arbitration, whose rights will be affected by award
is no ground to deny confirmation of award as between parties to the arbitration
proceeding); Long Island Univ. Faculty Fed'n v. Board of Trustees, 60 N.Y.2d
855, 857, 458 N.E.2d 381, 381, 470 N.Y.S.2d 140, 140 (1983) (failure to include
remedy in award is not fatal to award and is waived if omission is not objected
to; where award granted only declaration of rights of parties without award of
money damages, court cannot supply omission); Board of Educ. v. Niagara-Wheat-
field Teachers Ass'n, 46 N.Y.2d 553, 553, 389 N.E.2d 104, 107, 415 N.Y.S.2d
790, 793 (1979) (interest on award runs from date of award).
126. N.Y. Civ. PR.c. LAW § 7511(b)(l)(i), (ii) (McKinney 1980).
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grounds for vacatur has been rejected.127 On the other hand, in cases
in this category, on occasion, the court has found sufficient grounds
for vacatur of the award. 28 For vacatur based on bias of one serving
as an impartial arbitrator, there must be proof, not only of the
appearance of bias, but of actual bias as well.' 29
In summary, it bears repeating that judicial intervention in ar-
bitration proceedings in the guise of judicial review is very, very
limited. The possibility of obtaining judicial relief from an adverse
award in arbitration is so remote as never safely to be relied on in
prospective planning.
VII. Miscellaneous Cases
The New York State Court of Appeals has decided several cases
which touch on arbitration, but which do not fall within any of
the foregoing classifications. Some of these cases may be placed in
a category as decisions relating to the effect in judicial proceedings
of awards in arbitration. In several instances, the court has held
that, under res judicata principles, an award in arbitration is to be
given the same preclusive effect as it would have had had it been
a final judgment in a prior judicial proceeding. 30 In Allied Building
127. Harwyn Luggage, Inc. v. Henry Rosenfeld, Inc., 58 N.Y.2d 1063, 449
N.E.2d 422, 462 N.Y.S.2d 642 (1983) (denial of request for adjournment to change
counsel); Feisthamel v. State Dep't of Envtl. Conservation, 57 N.Y.2d 696, 440
N.E.2d 534, 454 N.Y.S.2d 534 (1982) (refusal to hear evidence of good character
and past history on issue of propriety in dismissal of employees); Peninsula Nat'l
Bank v. Joseph M. Turecamo, Inc., 56 N.Y.2d 794, 437 N.E.2d 1155, 452 N.Y.S.2d
398 (1982) (refusal to grant adjournment to obtain new counsel and refusal to
-accept certain documentary evidence); Civil Serv. Employees Ass'n v. Soper, 56
N.Y.2d 639, 436 N.E.2d 192, 450 N.Y.S.2d 786 (1982) (receipt of testimony of
mental patient conditioned on availability of her file); Sprinzen v. Nomberg, 46
N.Y.2d 623, 389 N.E.2d 456, 415 N.Y.S.2d 974 (1979) (relationship of arbitrator
to other party known to applicant and receipt of compensation from the other for
services); Siegel v. Lewis, 40 N.Y.2d 687, 358 N.E.2d 484, 389 N.Y.S.2d 800 (1976)
(prior relationship of arbitrator to other party known to applicant when arbitration
agreement made); Professional Staff Congress/City Univ. of N.Y. v. Board of
Higher Educ., 39 N.Y.2d 319, 347 N.E.2d 918, 383 N.Y.S.2d 592 (1976) (exclusion
of evidence in conformity with contract terms); Stern v. Lentnek, 34 N.Y.2d 932,
316 N.E.2d 872, 359 N.Y.S.2d 557 (1974) (request by arbitrator for compensation).
128. J.P. Stevens & Co. v. Rytex Corp., 34 N.Y.2d 123, 312 N.E.2d 466, 356
N.Y.S.2d 278 (1974) (relationship of arbitrator to party); see Raisler Corp. v. New
York City Hous. Auth., 32 N.Y.2d 274, 298 N.E.2d 91, 344 N.Y.S.2d 917 (1973)
(refusal to receive relevant evidence).
129. See Kornit v. Plainview-Old Bethpage Cent. School Dist., 49 N.Y.2d 842,
404 N.E.2d 1327, 427 N.Y.S.2d 786 (1980).
130. Zupan v. Firestone, 59 N.Y.2d 709, 450 N.E.2d 245, 463 N.Y.S.2d 439
(1983); Velazquez v. Water Taxi, Inc., 49 N.Y.2d 762, 403 N.E.2d 172, 426 N.Y.S.2d
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Inspectors International Union of Operating Engineers v. Office of
Labor Relations,' the court held that an agreement to arbitrate is
not a defense to a judicial action, nor does it provide a predicate
for dismissal of the action.'3 2 It does, however, provide the basis
for an order compelling arbitration and for a stay of the judicial
proceedings pending arbitration.'33
VIII. Conclusion
As with any specially designed tool, arbitration should be well
understood by those who would use it. It is not to be thought of
as a blunt implement. It is not suited to all purposes; it is peculiarly
well-suited to some. Unlike many means available for the resolution
of disputes, each proceeding in arbitration can be individually struc-
tured to identify the precise question or questions to be resolved,
the framework for their resolution, and the broad range within which
remedies can be fashioned. By counterbalance, it is open to the
parties to stipulate the prerequisites that must be met before arbi-
tration can be invoked, the constraints which must be observed in
the conduct of the arbitration proceeding or in the selection of
remedies, and even the limited consequences which will attach to
the award. Arbitration should be recognized as an enormously flexible
instrument.
It is all these factors which make it incumbent on the practicing
attorney carefully to familiarize himself or herself not only with the
rules and procedures in general, but as well with the treatment
accorded arbitration proceedings and awards in the courts and the
judicially sanctioned opportunities which exist for individual design.
467 (1980); American Ins. Co. v. Messinger, 43 N.Y.2d 184, 371 N.E.2d 798, 401
N.Y:S.2d 36 (1977). Contra Rembrandt Indus., Inc. v. Hodges Int'l, Inc., 38 N.Y.2d
502, 344 N.E.2d 383, 381 N.Y.S.2d 451 (1976).
131. 45 N.Y.2d 735, 380 N.E.2d 303, 408 N.Y.S.2d 476 (1978).
132. Id. at 738, 380 N.E.2d at 305, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 478.
133. Id. at 738, 380 N.E.2d at 305, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 479. The court has also
considered the rights of infants in arbitration. See, e.g., Prinze v. Jonas, 38 N.Y.2d
570, 345 N.E.2d 295, 381 N.Y.S.2d 824 (1976) (when age of majority was twenty-
one, arbitration agreement by nineteen year old upheld as reasonable application
of N.Y. GEN. OBL. LAW § 3-105); Aetna Life & Casualty Co. v. Stekardis, 34
N.Y.2d 182, 313 N.E.2d 53, 356 N.Y.S.2d 587 (1974) (failure to obtain an order
under CPLR § 1209 prior to submission to arbitration not fatal, provided such
an order is obtained before opening of arbitration hearing; N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAW
§ 1209 (McKinney Supp. 1986) provides: "[a] controversy involving an infant,
person judicially declared to be incompetent or conservatee shall not be submitted
to arbitration except pursuant to a court order made upon application of the
representative of such infant, incompetent or conservatee").
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